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ABSTRACT
Drug control policy on the Southwest U.S. border
requires an exceptional level of cooperation between Mexico
and the United States. This thesis examines the
formulation and evolution of drug control policies in both
countries, and analyzes the mutual interests and the unique
constraints facing them. The thesis recommends eight
proposals for improving cooperation between Mexico and the
United States in the war on drugs, which include: 1.
Resisting intervention; 2. Providing economic assistance;
3. Utilizing the Justice department as the lead agency; 4.
Imposing strict guidelines for operations in Mexico; 5.
Forging consensus multilaterally instead of bilaterally; 6.
Sharing intelligence; 7. Developing intermilitary ties;
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I. THE DRUG POLICY DEBATE
In choosing a strategy to combat illicit drugs, the
United States gcvernment has adopted a plan which, at least
in the near term is heavily dependent on interdiction and
eradication. According to the 1990 National Drua Control
Srtgy, the administration of President George Bush
recognizes that the war against drugs requires a
comprehensive, multifront approach.1 In effect, the most
recent government plan is an admission of the limited
effectiveness of unilateral interdiction and a call for a
more through evaluation of all components of counter-
narcotics policy. Using the framework outlined in the
National Drua Control Strateav's chapters on "International
Initiatives" and "Interdiction Efforts", this thesis seeks
to evaluate the feasibility of bilateral and multilateral
drug policies with regard to Mexico as an alternative to the
unilateral actions which currently predominate.
As interdiction will remain a central component of drug
policy for several years, the United States government must
respond to the challenge posed by more complex interdiction
1The White House, National Drug Control Strateav,
January 1990, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1990), p. 2.
1
operations. Whereas previous interdiction efforts have been
carried out unilaterally, often with little regard for the
sensitivities of other governments, future interdiction will
be focused on the Southwest U.S. border where Mexican
sovereignty is a fundamental issue.
The cumulative effect of recent interdiction operations
on the Eastern and Southeastern channels of drug traffic
into the United States has produced a concentration of
trafficking aimed at penetrating the Southwest. The
apparent success of maritime and air interdiction tactics
elsewhere has forced the front of the drug war to shift to
regions, (land, sea and air), contiguous with Mexico. This
development is most daunting because it precludes the
continued application of tactics used successfully
elsewhere, given that unilateral efforts are unlikely to
produce the same results without undesirable damage to
United States-Mexican bilateral relations.
This thesis recognizes the unique challenge posed by a
shift in the majority of drug trafficking to the Southwest
border and seeks to identify feasible poLicies to stem the
flow of drugs in this region. The argument herein supports
the assessment that interdiction, properly handled in the
context of bilateral United States-Mexican relations, is a
viable and essential aspect of drug control policy. In
contrast to the majority of literature on drug policy, the
objective is not the dismissal of interdiction as futile
2
and unworkable. Instead, this thesis seeks the
identification of plausible policy plans which take into
account the domestic policy constraints in the United
States and Mexico, and the delineation of inappropriate
policy options based on the same criteria.
This assessment of a workable joint strategy employs a
comparative approach which highlights the distinct
characteristics of the two policy-making structures and
identifies mutual interests. To strengthen the argument
for the adoption of prescribed bilateral measures, an
evaluation of unilateral and multi.ateral initiatives is
included. The objective is to demonstrate that if United
States drug policy is to succeed on the Southwest border,
it must recognize and adapt to the unique constraints
imposed by the Mexican state.
Previous literature on United States drug control
policy has examined a wide range of social, political and
economic effects with very little emphasis on compiling
effective policy guidelines to combat the problems. Works
that preceded the adoption of the current National DruQ
Control Strategy were most often superficial treatments of
the simplistic "supply" versus "demand" debate or thinly
veiled attacks on interdiction as an impotent policy.
Until recently, scholarly debate has rarely recognized
interdiction as policy with limited objectives, choosing
instead to attack a "straw man" argument that interdiction
3
is a panacea. It must be acknowledged that interdiction
will remain a crucial component of anti-drug strategy in
t2i near term, and the effects of that policy must be
adu essed in the larger context of national interest. This
includes a more fruitful debate about how to adapt strategy
to work in the framework of bilateral and multilateral
cooperation.
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW
Several books have been written with the expressed
purpose of determining the guidelines for public policy
debate. William 0. Walker's Drug Control In The
A a2, Donald Hamowy's collection Pealinq With
Drugs3 , and Scott B. MacDonald's Dancing On A
Volcano 4 , are essential reading before undertaking serious
discussion of drug control policy. Each of these works
offers a different perspective on the pertinent issues
needed to be addressed by a comprehensive strategy.
Segments of each book devote attention to the critical role
2William 0. Walker, III, Drug Control in the
Americas, (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico
Press, 1981 - Revised edition 1988).
3Donald Hamowy, ed., Dealing With Drugs, Pacific
Research Institute for Public Policy, (Lexington,
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987).
4Scott B. MacDonald, Dancing on a Volcano, (New York:
Praeger, 1988).
4
of Mexico, and United States-Mexican relations, in
achieving desired policy objectives.
To counter those who would describe current anti-drug
measures as a new phenomenon, one reed only consult William
Walker's Drua Control In The Americas for an historical
record of a century of United States drug control efforts
in Latin America. Initially undertaken to outline only the
precursory development of drug policy until 1940, Walker's
revised edition of the book includes an epilogue to detail
policy initiatives from 1970 to 1988. As an accounting of
previous policy attempts and failures, Walker's book is
unequaled.
Given that emphasis herein is on present activities and
future plans in drug control policy, the epilogue chapter
of Drug Control In The Americas is most valuable. Walker
stresses that United States leadership on the issue is
essential, since consensus must be forged by Washington to
overcome the apathy of Latin American states who do not
have the intense historical and cultural aversion to drug
use. With regard to Mexico, Walker poignantly draws
attention to the fact that Mexican officials perceive their
own anti-drug fervor as greater than that of the United
States.5
5Walker, Drug Control In The Americas, revised edition,
p. 195.
5
Walker's conclusion is concise and enlightened. Having
examined nearly a century of United States anti-narcotics
tactics in Latin America, his final paragraph contains the
following advice:
At no time has interdiction resulted in the seizure of
more than 10 to 15 percent of illicit traffic. For drug
control to become more of a reality in the Americas, the
threat of drugs must be met with a greater sense than
ever before of the mutual task that lies ahead.
Curtailing production or demand alone is not a sufficient
approach to controlling drugs. Real flexibility in
hemispheric anti-na9cotic policy lies in recognition of
those simple facts.
Dancing On A Volcano, like Walker's Drug Control In
The Americas, is by design more descriptive than
prescriptive. Short of issuing specific proposals,
MacDonald asserts that neither interdiction alone nor
legalization on the opposite extreme offers a satisfactory
solution. He proposes a balance of supply restriction and
demand reduction, suggesting positive incentives to help
underdeveloped economies to replace drug production rather
than coercive measures. MacDonald's sketchy proposals,
including the creation of a coordinating drug "czar", are
very similar to the adopted drug control strategy of the
Bush administration.
MacDonald's book is an invaluable point of departure
for any comprehensive assessment of drug policy. While his
6Walker, Drug Control In The Americas, revised edition,
p. 223.
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treatment of certain aspects of the drug trade are brief,
he avoids oversimplification for the most part. Of special
importance to future policy considerations is the care
taken to demonstrate that smuggling and illicit trade are
not recent phenomena in the exporting Latin American
countries.
As for the ramifications of United States drug policy
on bilateral relations with Mexico, MacDonald's analysis
demonstrates the constraints of his broad perspective. He
adeptly highlights the conflictual character of policy
differences, stating:
Mexico has long favored demand-side solutions, while
pursuing supply side interdiction, sometimes under
duress. Mexicans often feel that the United State9
seeks to blame Mexico for the inflow of narcotics.
He critically notes that "narcotics come to the fore
usually only after a major incident ... , which causes most
disputes to be settled in a "state of great sensitivity."'8
Such a perspective strengthens his proposal that bilateral
and multilateral cooperation is essential for success, a
view shared by others but rarely so concisely explained.
It is far too easy to cite omissions from MacDonald's
treatment of Mexico's drug trade, but such criticism would
ignore the author's intentionally limited scope and
7MacDonald, Dancina On A Volcano, p. 84.
8MacDonald, Dancing On A Volcano, p. 85.
7
disregard his contribution to viewing the drug control
problem as a hemispheric challenge. However, his assertion
that the Mexican ruling party does not prosecute widespread
corruption for fear of embarrassment is offered without any
further elaboration and reflects a misunderstanding of
domestic political difficulties.
Whereas both Walker and MacDonald frame the drug
control policy debate in terms of a mutual United States-
Latin America problem, several articles in Dealina With
Lrugs, edited by Donald Hamowy, assail the effects of
unilateral United States policy. Despite the underlying
message that decriminalization if not legalization is the
only proper governmental action, Dealina With Druas
contains three scholarly essays of benefit to policy makers
of any predilection.
A chapter entitled "Curing the Drug-Law Addiction" by
law professor Richard Barnett notes the undesirable effects
of prohibition to confront growing demand. Beyond the
familiar description of the economic principle of high
demand and low supply causing prices to rise and making
drug trafficking more lucrative, Barnett also points out
the rarely considered likelihood of domestically developed
"designer" drugs emerging to fill the demand. His
examination of how increased interdiction efforts raise the
profitability of corruption to an almost irresistible level
is also a noteworthy admonishment.
8
In another valuable chapter in Dealing With Drugs,
respected legal expert and critic of drug policy, Arnold
Trebach emphasizes that current drug law is not responsive
to changing realities. In his chapter "The Need for Reform
of International Narcotics Laws," Trebach notes that the
only notable success in drug prohibition in recent decades
occurred in Singapore, which employed extreme measures,
such as the death penalty for possession of heroin, deemed
implausible for universal application by Trebach and this
author.
Finally, Jonathan Marshall's section "Drugs and United
States Foreign Policy" calls attention to the destabilizing
effects of U.S. eradication and interdiction efforts in
foreign nations. While his assessment that drug policy
is nothing more than "a new subtle form of U.S.
intervention abroad"9 to replace anti-communism is an
oversimplification, he formulates an interesting corollary
to this hypothesis. Citing Argentine pleas for aid to
fight guerrillas supposedly involved in drug trafficking to
9Jonathan Marshall, "Drugs and United States Foreign
Policy," in Donald Hamowy, ed., Dealing With Drugs,
(Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 138.
9
circumvent human rights oversight in the United States
Congress, he asserts:
That neat formula would become a standard operating
procedure of foreign leaders: Implicate the enemy in
drug crimes, then collect U.S. police aid without any
unpleasant questions from Washington.10
Marshall's argument has specific implications for United
States-Mexican policy - he links drug control efforts in
the state of Guerrero not to legitimate eradication plans
but to a systematic persecution of anti-government
protestors.11 Overall, Marshall asserts that the ill
effects of drug enforcement - militarization of society and
the repression of liberal institutions - outweigh the
benefits.
B. UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS AND DRUG CONTROL
In the last five years a growing awareness of the
significance of drug control along the Mexican border as a
central component of drug policy has spurred a large volume
of literature. Some approach drug control in the context
of larger United States-Mexican diplomatic relations, while
others tend to focus on the negative effects of unilateral
policy by the United States on a Mexican government without
10Marshall in Hamowy, Dealina With Drugs, p. 150.
11 Ibid., p. 153.
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recourse. Almost without exception, treatments of the
critical agenda of United States-Mexican bilateral
relations in the 1990's give great weight to finding a
mutually acceptable drug policy. Those focused on United
States drug policy alone share a similar concern about the
criticality of obtaining Mexican compliance, if not
cooperation, on drug control issues.
In the process of highlighting critical aspects of a
multitude of bilateral issues, Mexico and the United
States: Manaaina the Relationship contains a number of
essays dealing with the intricacies of drug policy and
their impact on domestic and bilateral politics.12 A
compilation of articles aspiring to give a balanced
appraisal of issues vital to the bilateral relationship in
the 1990's, this volume edited by Riordan Roett
incorporates views from both Mexican and United States
authors. The introductory remarks by Roett stress the
economic, social and cultural "interpenetration" of the two
nations, but also contends that there are global
implications for the bilateral relationship. One such
issue with broader application is that of drug control.
12Riordan Roett, ed., Mexico and the United States:




It may well be that the drug threat will emerge as
the next critical policy issue between the two
countries. But the drug issue is not just bilateral.
It is clearly hemispheric. It invokes matters of
security and foreign policy. And it is the one
divisive policy area in which it is probably fair to
say that as much cul?3bility rests with the United
States as elsewhere.
Culpability may be the most volatile aspect of what Roett
calls "the most contentious bilateral issue.''14 According
to the editor, the friction stems from United States
cynicism and moral superiority toward Mexico. He faults
United States leadership for failing to recognize the
linked issues of Mexican economic woes and United States
domestic demand for drugs in the development of a coherent
strategy. He argues that a "mutual" program for drug
control should be an immediate objective for both
administrations, especially in light of the 1986 Omnibus
Drug Law which ties trade and cooperation to drug control
efforts through a certification process Roett calls a "time
bomb."15
A second, less heard from yet invaluable perspective is
conveyed in an essay by Samuel I. del Villar, a former
1 3Roett, p.3.
14Roett, p. 13.
15 For more information on the 1986 Omnibus Drug Bill
see P.L. 99-570 and "The Controversy Over Omnibus Drug
Legislation," Congressional Digest, November, 1986.
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adviser to the Miguel De La Madrid (1982-1988)
administration and a member of the Bilateral Commission on
the Future of United States-Mexican relations. Villar
sketches an image of Mexican cooperation on drug control in
sharp contrast to the depictions of irate U.S. policy
makers. Using U.S. government statistics, Villar argues
forcefully that the United States drug policy is a failure,
even in those areas in which it is proclaimed to be making
progress. Moreover, he asserts that Mexico has been more
successful at limiting drug supply than the United States
has been at limiting domestic demand.16
In building an insightful and logical argument against
the proposed goals of U.S. drug policy, Villar refutes
accepted logic on the efficacy of supply-side control. He
cites federalism and constitutional liberties in the United
States as insurmountable obstacles to the implementation of
a coherent coercive policy. He argues:
The police and the military are not viable instruments
for changing massive cultural patterns in a free society,
as was proven T the American experience with Prohibition
in the 1920's.
16Samuel I. del Villar, "The Illicit United States-
Mexico Drug Market: Failure of a Policy and an
Alternative," in Roett, ed., Mexico and the United States:




Villar's chapter lends credence to the argument that
massive interdiction and eradication efforts are
counterproductive, accounting for the spread of corruption
of enforcement officials and undermining fragile
institutions. However, Villar falls prey to the syndrome
of attacking interdiction and eradication as a
unidimensional policy. He argues more persuasively when he
refutes the assessment that Mexico benefits from the
infusion of "narcodollars", countering that the drug trade
enriches few and leads to a greater concentration of
wealth. Assessments made by the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment reached a similar conclusion in
1987.18
Most poignantly, Villar accuses U.S. eradication
efforts of making "scapegoats" of defenseless Mexican
peasants by means of coercive policy. Villar, and Gregory
Treverton - a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, conclude that efforts should focus on drug
traffickers and associated organized crime figures and
avoid the fruitless harassment of peasants resulting from
eradication programs.19 This suggestion is slowly being
incorporated in policy plans.
18Office of Technology Assessment, United States
Congress, The Border War on Drugs, (Washington, D.C.: OTA,
March 18, 1987).
19Villar in Roett, p. 196.
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As a prescription for future policy, Villar calls for
the adoption if "symmetry" in drug policy, urging the
United States to enact like programs in quantity and kind
that it demands of the Mexican government. Voicing
concerns that the costs of U.S. anti-drug policy are
becoming unbearable for Mexico, Villar stresses that the
primary common interest that Mexico and the United States
share is "checking, curtailing, and eventually destroying
the power that narco-dollar financed organized crime has
acquired for subverting the rule of law in both
countries."2 0
The friction arising from contradictory appraisals of
resolve on both sides of the border is not the unique
perception of Villar. In an article in Foreign Policy
entitled "Misunderstanding Mexico," Cuauhtemoc Cardenas,
the leading opposition candidate in Mexico's most recent
presidential elections, accuses the administration of
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (elected in 1988) of
subordinating "national interests, self respect, and
sovereignty" to United States policy objectives.2 1
20Ibid., p. 202.
2 1Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, "Misunderstanding Mexico,"
Foreian Policy, 78 (Spring 1990), p. 116.
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According to Cardenas,
...American hopes for Mexican cooperation now go well
beyond the limits normally accepted by sovereign states.
In this fight against drugs there is now in Washington
a troubling tendency to judge Mexico's performance not
so much by the results achieved but on the basis of
Mexico's willingness to follow U.S. criteria and
guidelines and to allow American drug enforcement
authorities to operate inside Mexico exempt from
reasonable jurisdictional limits.
Cardenas's article is helpful for gaining an awareness of
the domestic constraints on compliance with U.S. initiated
drug policy.
The core conflict on drug policy in bilateral relations
is also briefly illuminated in the broader context of
United States - Latin American relations by Abraham
Lowenthal in Partners in Conflict: The United States and
Latin America. Primarily a work about the overall policy
agenda, Lowenthal develops four categories of U.S. policy
options toward Latin America: (1) Intermittent
intervention; (2) sustained disengagement; (3) activism,
and (4) developmentalism.2 3 While Lowenthal assesses that
Mexico exerts special leverage and requires sustained
22Ibid., p. 117.
23Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United
States and Latin America, (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1987).
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diplomatic, economic, and development oriented attention
from the United States, U.S. drug policy most appropriately
fits under the category of intermittent intervention.
Lowenthal contends that "proximity, interpenetration
and asymmetry fundamentally structure U.S. relations with
Mexico."2 4 He addresses the drug control issue only in the
context of a broad agenda of mutual interests. Professing
the complexity of the relationship, Lowenthal views the
best option for relieving bilateral pressures is the
application of general regional policies to Mexican
relations. In part, this approach is an attempt to diffuse
pressures of potentially "destructive confrontation" tied
to nationalism on both sides. However, such a proposal
ignores the special significance Mexico holds in future
drug control strategy. Broad policies can not adequately
manage distinct bilateral needs and constraints. While
Lowenthal's proposal averts ruptures in bilateral
relations, it is unrealistic for the complex cooperation
needed for effective drug policy.
Additionally, Lowenthal advocates developmentalism as
a coherent regional policy to replace sporadic and
disruptive crisis management. He convincingly argues that
24Ibid., p. 77.
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building infrastructure and garnering support for
institutions has greater long term benefits for security
and stability.
A view shared by almost all the previously mentioned
authors is most articulately stated by Kevin McCarthy of
the Rand Corporation.25 McCarthy stresses that any
bilateral issue, and especially drug control, has important
local components in both nations. The efforts to limit
interpenetration of the two distinct cultures are extremely
complicated when approached at a local level. Legal
objectives at the federal level are responsible for the
establishment of broad guidelines which can not always be
realistically applied to local interdiction in the border
regions. Of specific relevance to illicit drug traffic
interdiction is the potentially damaging impact on legal
interpenetration. McCarthy notes
Moreover, the transportation routes set up to foster
these legitimate economic exchanges facilitate a much
wider range of transactions, including U.S. contraband
into Mexico and Mexican contraband and migrants irto
the United States. Finally, efforts of both
governments to reztrict these respective flows have
not been notably successful. Even when they are,2they
often trigger a response by the other government."
25Kevin McCarthy, InterdeDendence in the United States-
Mexican Borderlands, (P-6889), (Santa Monica, California:
Rand Corporation Study, June 1983).
26Ibid., p. 3.
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McCarthy's assessment in "Interdependence in the United
States-Mexican Borderlands" raises fundamental questions
about the plausibility of border interdiction, and raises
the issue of mutually agreeable solutions. Most certainly
one may conclude that unilateral action, without
corresponding support on the opposite side of the border,
has little chance of success.
C. A SHIFT IN STRATBGY
The learning process to arrive at a successful drug
control strategy is a long and arduous one. The driving
force behind the current shift in strategy from unilateral
to a more multilateral approach emerged from several
critical studies.
The Border War on Drugs published by the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) in March 1987 revealed some
startling deficiencies concerning United States
interdiction efforts from 1981-1986.27 Most important,
OTA's evaluation expressed pessimism about the efficacy of
interdiction while highlighting major deficiencies in
intelligence, data compilation, and coherent organization
27Office of Technology Assessment, United States
Congress, The Border War on Drugs, (Washington, D.C.: OTA,
March 18, 1987).
19
of drug fighting assets. The Border War on Druas asserted
that
There is no clear correlation between the level of
expenditures or effort devoted to interdiction and
the long term availability of illegally imported
drugs in the domestic market.2
Similarly, a Rand study undertaken to evaluate the probable
effects of increased military participation in interdiction
on the Mexican border concluded "that a major increase in
military support is unlikely to significantly reduce drug
consumption in the United States."2 9
Both the OTA document and the "Sealing the Borders"
study compiled for Rand by Peter Reuter predict outcomes
for future interdiction on the basis of the results of
poorly coordinated federal efforts of the past. The
underlying assumptions may be valid, but it is also
arguable that efficient interdiction has never been
implemented. Therefore, the conclusions reached about
interdiction must be qualified, pointing out that they are
derived from data which project continued inefficiency.
The study conducted by the Office of Technology
Assessment errs in projecting deficiencies of the present
28Ibid., p. 3.
29Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, Jonathan Cave,
Sealina the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military
Participation in Drug Interdiction, (Santa Monica,
California: The Rand Corporation, 1988), R-3594-USDP.
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through the future to arrive at pessimistic conclusions.
The assessment of the efficacy of interdiction can hardly
be appropriate if shortcomings in intelligence and
coordination of assets are corrected. Wisely, Congress and
the President have decided to withhold judgment until
better information becomes available.
Sealing the Borders begins with some valid, justifiable
assumptions, but also includes more disputable building
blocks. Some of the more valid assumptions include the use
of price of drugs to indicate the effectiveness of
interdiction. However, as the authors themselves admit,
the Simulation of Adaptive Response (SOAR) model used to
test the reactive capabilities of smugglers "may overstate
how quickly (they) make adjustment."30 The SOAR model used
by Reuter and his staff for drug trafficker behavior
attributes to these actors an unrealistic flexibility and
responsiveness to interdiction efforts, while concurrently
undervaluing the learning capabilities of interdicting
forces. Moreover, Reuter gives little credence to the
concept that disruption of drug trafficking networks over a
short period provides long term gains. In reality, a
30Ibid., p. 108.
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policy that interrupts the flow of drugs through
established channels creates confusion, causing traffickers
to assume greater risks to achieve previous objectives.
United States military operations in conjunction with law
enforcement agencies in the Caribbean have demonstrated
this effect.
Other scholars have found more troublesome problems
with interdiction. The underlying problem with the
previously surveyed studies is the focus on interdiction as
a panacea rather than an intermediate goal. Until the
announcement of the first National Drua Control Strateav in
1989, which emphasized a more balanced approach between
restricting external supply and reducing domestic demand,
interdiction was viewed as comprising a disproportionate
share of overall tactical concerns. While many still view
interdiction as costly and ineffective, critics of
interdiction must understand its role as an intermediate
objective.
Perhaps the most ardent and articulate foe of
interdiction and its complement eradication, is Harvard
University's Ethan Nadelmann. In journal articles and
speeches, Nadelmann assails the externally oriented drug
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strategy of the United States as a "bad export."'3 1
Nadelmann supports his pessimistic outlook on interdiction
and eradication efforts with the observation that there is
no "deeply rooted moral consensus that the activity (drug
production] is wrong."32 He finds policy implausible
because creating an external consensus against the
manufacture and sale of illicit drugs may be impossible,
remarking
crimes that require limited resources and no particular
expertise to commit, that are easily concealable, and
that create no victims with an interest in notifying
authoritigs are most likely to resist enforcement
efforts.JJ
Nadelmann must reluctantly agree, however, that victims of
drug related violence contradict his premise. Moreover,
the United States has begun to forge an international
consensus against drug production and use.
Finally, a recently published book edited by Donald
Mabry incorporates writings of the leading United States
scholars on drug control policy. Chapters by Richard B.
31Ethan Nadelmann, "U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export,"
Foreign Policy, 70, (Spring 1988), pp. 83-108. Similar
statements can be found in "Drugs and Small Arms: Can Law
Stop the Traffic?" American Society of Law, (April 1987),
pp. 48-53.
32Nadelman, "U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export," p. 89.
33Ibid., p. 102.
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Craig and Bruce Michael Bagley in The Latin American
Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security serve as points
of departure for this thesis.34 Both Craig and Bagley
demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the complexities of
drug control policy, particularly with regard to Mexico.
In his chapter "Mexican Narcotics Traffic: Binational
Security Implications", Richard Craig adeptly identifies
the mutually harmful effects of increasing narcotics
related problems in Mexico. Identifying the threats as
"Narcoterror" and "Narcocorruption", he asserts that Mexico
is facing a well armed, well financed attack on its
stability. Craig identifies the shortcomings of past
Mexican governments in dealing with critical national
problems, such as rural neglect and a failure to shore up
its political legitimacy. He concisely outlines areas of
mutual policy to combat narcotics trafficking.
Craig is also critical of Washington, accusing the
United States government of consistently steering a course
toward an external solution to the drug problem, laLely in
3 4Donald Mabry, ed., The Latin American Narcotics
Trade and U.S. National Security, (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1990).
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Mexico. He is especially critical of the U.S. propensity
for unilateral action, recommending that
... the U.S. should abandon its unilateral policy
tendencies, including the sporadic Operation Intercept
syndrome. Numerous mechanisms exist for consultation
on such matters. And Mexico should be consulted. If
it refuses, for whatever reason to cooperate, that is
Mexico's pprogative. At least it will have been
consulted.4
Bruce Michael Bagley traces the recent history of drug
trafficking and its related effects on United States-Latin
American relations, and is as critical as Craig.
Describing United States-Mexican drug diplomacy as
"cyclical, unilateral and incident prone3 6," Bagley
outlines four policy options for the United States in his
chapter "The New Hundred Years War?: U.S. National
Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America."
Briefly summarized, Bagley says U.S. choices involve:
1. Financing the mobilization of Latin America's drug
fighting capabilities.
2. "Americanization" of the drug effort by having the
U.S. government assume drug enforcement functions.
35Richard B. Craig, "Mexican Narcotics Traffic:
Binational Security Implications," in Donald Mabry, ed.,
The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National
Se , (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1990),
p. 41.
36Bruce Michael Bagley, "The New Hundred Years War?:
U.S. National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin
America," in Mabry The Latin American Narcotic Trade and
U.S. National Security, p.49.
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3. Providing support for viable economic alternatives
in countries that do not or can not perform.
to the drug trade.
4. Abandon the war on 3 rugs by legalization or
decriminalization.
In the near term, Bagley recommends that the United
States should seek to "employ less rhetoric and more
diplomacy, which might permit greater U.S. cooperation with
the very Latin American countries from whom active support
is most needed."38 The need for a cooperative framework
for the mutual threat posed by drug trafficking is central
to Bagley's prescription.
Within Bagley's description of U.S. relations with
Latin American states on issues of drug control is a
metaphor of "peaks and valleys" to describe United States-
Colombian relations. That phrase accurately depicts United
States-Mexican relations as well. Taking this theme, as
well as other ideas from Bagley and Richard Craig, this
thesis seeks to identify specific bilateral, cooperative
ventures to further the interests of Mexico and the United
States in their battle against the destabilizing effects of
illicit drug trafficking. By acknowledging constraints as
37Ibid., p. 52-53.
38 Ibid., P. 55.
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well as objectives in policy, the author aspires to provide
a series of concrete proposals to smooth out the "peaks and
valleys" in United States-Mexican relations on drug control
issues.
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II. U.S. PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY
An effective, coherent and integrated drug control
strategy has eluded United States policy makers for
decades. The ineffectiveness and disarray in domestic
pursuit of illicit drug traffickers and abusers, coupled
with escalating domestic consumer demand, makes legislation
oriented toward external supply appear misguided.
Moreover, the application of stricter standards of control
abroad than at home undermines efforts at cooperation and
substantiates the perspective that a double standard
exists. The inability of the United States policy making
structure to devise and implement a comprehensive plan of
action, and to rationally balance local, state, federal
domestic and foreign policy goals, has created a vocal
minority in favor of abandoning the burden of drug control
by legalization. Voices for legalization represent, in the
most pessimistic manifestation, frustration with the
national policy making structure.
Through an historical examination of evolutionary
trends and an exploration of the predispositions of key
institutions and agencies involved in interdiction and
restriction of drug production at the source, this chapter
seeks to illuminate the basic tenets of United States drug
control policy. By identifying the underlying assumptions
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associated with current supply reduction efforts, with
particular regard to Mexico, it attempts to differentiate
rational interests from ill conceived aims which undermine
long term cooperation and effectiveness. The overriding
assertion herein is that, until recently, policy aims have
been inconsistent and dysfunctional - that is to say,
doomed to failure by the incompatibility of the tools
employed and the tasks they are expected to perform. It
has been only through the rationalization of domestic drug
control policy and structure that the United States policy
makers have gained a clearer understanding of how
externally oriented policy should be organized and
implemented.
In the late 1980's, the United States began to take the
first significant steps toward greater centralization of
drug control efforts, devoted greater resources to the
identification and assessment of drug related threats to
national security, and created a more cohesive structure to
combat the broad array of destabilizing elements arising
from an illicit drug trafficking. Enacting comprehensive
and integrated drug control strategy requires foremost the
assessment of the validity of underlying assumptions held
by the departments and agencies involved in constructing
and enforcing drug control policy, and the removal of
dysfunctional concepts and other road blocks to success.
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United States drug policy implementation is most
complex along the Southwest Border and within Mexico;
therefore an examination of problems in this region offers
the greatest opportunity to identify ill conceived policy.
A wide variety of interdependent interests complicate
policy here as nowhere else, because no other drug
trafficking incursion area forces the United States to
constrain its otherwise unilateral policy the way the
Mexican land border does. Faced with the complexity of
dealing with, cooperating with, or coercing assistance from
the Mexican government, the strengths and weaknesses of
United States policy most blatantly surface in this
bilateral relationship.
There have been other efforts to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of United States drug control policy,l but
none has endeavored to attribute the ill adapted paradigms
to the specific tools used for policy implementation. To
root out those aspects of policy which are ill suited for
lMost notable among these assessments are: Bruce
Michael Bagley, "U.S. Foreign Policy and The War on Drugs:
Analysis of Policy Failure," Journal of InterAmerican
Studies and World Affairs, vol. 30, no.2 & 3, (Summer/Fall
1988), pp. 190-212; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "U.S. Drug Policy:
A Bad Export," Foreign Policy, 70, (Spring 1990),
pp. 83-109; and Raphael F. Perl, "The U.S. Congress
International Drug Policy and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs,
vol. 30, no. 2 & 3, (Summer/Fall 1988), pp. 19-43.
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drug control on the Southwest border, the origin of policy
must be traced first through the organs which identify
interests and the tools to pursue them, and second, through
the departments and agencies which bring their own
prejudices to the task assigned.
United States drug strategy emanates primarily from the
two policy-initiating bodies of the federal government, the
Executive and the Legislative branches, with occasional
modifications introduced by federal judicial rulings and
state and local practices. Many of the fissures and
discontinuities in drug control policy have their origin in
the system of checks and balances that the two major bodies
of the federal government impose on each other. This
system of interaction, which produces the diffusion of
policy as it works its way through governmental
bureaucracy, has been accurately described by Michael J.
Kryzanek. Kryzanek does not assert that U.S. policy is
aimless, but suggests that U.S. policy "evolves" rather
than going directly from edict to practice.2 This thesis
is not concerned with
2Michael J. Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations,
second edition, (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 100.
Kryzanek describes the process by which U.S. policy is
altered by the complex network of government agencies,
each with a unique prescription for the furthering U.S.
interests in Latin America. Kryzanek argues that this
"diffusion" makes cohesion and coordination most difficult.
See chapters on "Elements of U.S. Policy making,"
pp. 99-167.
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disparaging the successful restraints on the abuse of powc-
imposed by the U.S. Constitution, but would cll attention
to some persistent aspects of drug policy which are the
result of agreement between these two bodies.
There are some tenets of drug control policy which have
achieved the status of doctrine by virtue of their being
the shared perception of both the Executive and Legislative
branches. The most prominent characteristics of policy
arising from this shared vision are:
1. A proclivity toward unilateral action in the
reduction of drug supply.
2. An increasingly belligerent and confrcntationial
approach to drug control at home and abroad.
3. The pursuit of centralization and coherency
by the paradoxical method of expanding bureaucracy.
4. A propensity to externalize and demonize, rather
than examine, the sources of the drug problem.
5. An inability to devise a policy or organization
capable of alleviating the plague of bureaucratic
"turf wars".
As the designated leadership of the United States, the
Executive and Legislative arms of government are
responsible for devising a strategy to combat the threat of
illicit drugs. The first step of strategy development is
the definition of interests at risk, and the relative
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intensity of those interests.3 Indifference to this maxim
has clearly undermined strategy formulation to date, in
that the level of governmental resources and attention
devoted to drug policy have fluctuated wildly. The
simplistic "supply" versus "demand" debate was
fundamentally a discussion of where resources should be
applied to protect vital interests of unevaluated relative
importance. Policy implementation began without a careful
assessment of the priority of interests. The realization
that both the supply of illicit drugs from foreign sources
and the demand of domestic drug abusers must be addressed
simultaneously to reflect the true nature of the problem
was not concisely explained until the announcement of the
National Drua Control Strategv in 1989. Prior to that
policy delineation, government policy makers were unclear
as to policy priorities, and implementation suffered
because of it. Governmental infighting to estcblish those
priorities, and to control the tools of policy
implementation, has contributed greatly to the inefficiency
of drug control policy.
3Donald Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United
States National Interests in the 1980's, (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1985).
33
A. TE PRIORITIES AND PREFERRED TOOLS OF TE EXECUTIVE
U.S. presidents have continually reshaped and
redirected drug control policy in the last two decades by
means of administrative reorganization decrees, foreign
policy initiatives, and national security directives. The
persistent executive perception of the illicit drug traffic
problem as primarily a foreign policy concern, rather than
a domestic agenda item, was preeminent until the late
1980's. Consistent with this outlook, the Executive may
be seen as using drug policy as a means of reclaiming its
perceived dominance in foreign policy.
Despite often belligerent rhetoric, presidents have
been more lenient and cooperative in dealings with drug
producing and drug transit countries than the Congress.
Perhaps this behavior stems from a broader understanding of
how diplomacy should be handled to achieve required
objectives, but more likely it arises from an awareness of
competing, sometimes covert objectives. President Reagan's
disregard for allegations of drug trafficking by the
Contras and by Manuel Noriega of Panama provide support for
the latter explanation.4 Competing policy objectives
introduce inconsistencies to policy enforcement that can
4Bagley, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the War On Drugs,"
p. 192.
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only be adequately redressed by an evaluation of professed
national priorities. The Executive has been reluctant to
allow further constraint on diplomatic initiative by
adherence to fundamental priorities established by
Congress, as human rights policy attestp. Presidents
jealousy guard against incursions on their perceived
autonomy in foreign policy.
It was under President Richard M. Nixon (1968-1974)
that the rhetoric of current drug policy first emerged. In
1973, Nixon declared an "all out war on the drug menace"5
and submitted Executive Reorganization Plan no. 2 to launch
the campaign. The plan consolidated a number of former
drug control agencies, the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), the Office of Drug Abuse Law
Enforcement (ODALE), and the Office of National Narcotics
Intelligence (ONNI) into a new organ, the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA).
Although the DEA encompassed the cumulative experience
of the majority of federal agencies, the chosen instrument
for international drug policy coordination under Nixon was
not the Justice Department, but the State Department. The
chief diplomatic arm of the United States has had a long
5Steven Wisotsky, ed., Breaking the Impasse in the War
On Drugs, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986),
p. 228.
35
and inglorious tenure as the coordinating department for
drug supply reduction programs.6 Nonetheless, a State
Department policy release in November 1972 conveyed
government plans to employ the State Department, and more
specifically the "coordinator of international narcotics
matters", to pursue drug policy as "a primary foreign
policy objective."7 The document highlighted the essential
need for "a combined program" which confronts both supply
and demand aspects for drug control.
I should stress that the approach of a successful
program cannot relate to supply alone. Nor is an attack
on the demand side alone the answer. Rather a combined
program is called for. The objective is to interdict
supply to the degree that availabilities are sharply
reduced. The shortage of drugs will then tend to drive
addicts into treatment ...
While the federal government's ability to balance
domestic and external drug control programs is not the
focus of this thesis, what is relevant is the efficiency
and coherency of foreign drug control measures. Despite
Executive initiatives to reorganize a chaotic bureaucracy
involved in the control of drug inflows at the border and
from foreign sources, and in contradiction to the
6Walker, Drug Control in the Americas, revised edition,
assails the role of the State Department.
7U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Leads Global War On
Drug Abuse," Current Foreign Policy,
8 Ibid., p. 11.
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invocation of a "combined approach" as early as 1972, there
was little evidence of progress in restructuring drug
control efforts through the remainder of the decade. In
testimony before the Senate Judiciary committee five years
after Nixon's 1973 reorganization plan was initiated, a
Government Accounting Office (GAO) Deputy Director
concluded
... separate agencies with different orientations
continue to identify the best means to meet their
specific missions, with limited consideration for
the activity of the others. There is obviously a
need for an integrated federal strategy and
comprehensive border control plan.
The assessment that there is a need for a comprehensive,
coherent strategy recurred in congressional testimony
annually through 1990.
As evidence of the dramatically slow progress of the
federal government's chosen instruments to coordinate drug
control policy, the Bureau of International Narcotics
Matters (BINM) of the State Department offers a telling
example. As the designated "lead agency" of the Executive
in the supervision of external drug policy, the State
9Testimony of William J. Anderson, Deputy Director,
GAO, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, of the
Committee on the Judiciary, "The Mexican Connection," 95th
Congress, 2nd session, February 10 and April 19, 1978.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p.
53.
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Department was sluggish in preparing for the task. It was
not until July, 1978 that the State Department undertook to
compile a data base for comparing drug laws in foreign
countries. Such an essential element for the preparation
of effective international policy took nearly a year to
compile, and when published, The Global Framework For
Narcotics and Prohibitive Substances, contained only
partial information on the most fundamental of drug laws
from a mere 52% of the countries targeted by the survey.1 0
Obtaining only half the necessary information for
development of an international cooperative framework
hardly reflected the energetic pursuit of a "primary
foreign policy goal." Persistent problems accumulating
relevant statistical data from which drug policy goals may
be devised endure to the present, and may significantly
account for misperceptions about the nature of the drug
control problem.
While the departments of State, Justice, Treasury,
Interior and Commerce, all seemingly cooperated under the
coordination of the State Department for matter of drug
10United States Department of State, Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters, The Global Legal Framework
For Narcotics and Prohibitive Substances, (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 29 June 1979), p. 1.
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control, the DEA eventually began to supplant the State
Department in drug control dealings with Mexico. By the
late 1970's the DEA had come to define drug control policy
in external areas, like Mexico, where drug policy became a
matter of national interest. The DEA produced the results,
arrests and seizures, that the President wanted, and in
some instances employed low level diplomatic pressure more
effectively than the State Department.11 Originally deemed
to be an example of the futility of bureaucratic
reorganization,12 the DEA proved to be a fruitful result of
the rationalization of at least part of the drug control
framework. Moreover, as the DEA came increasingly under
tutelage of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
United States external drug control policy has become more
consistent with domestic efforts, and has benefitted from
the growing cooperation between the United States and
Mexican Attorney Generals. In sharp contrast to the
llEthan A. Nadelmann, "The DEA in Latin America:
Dealing With Institutional Corruption," Journal of
InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, Volume 29,
no. 4, (Winter 1987-1988), p. 3.
12Patricia Rachal, Federal Narcotics Enforcements:
Reorganization and Reform, (Boston, Massachusetts: Auburn
House Publishing, 1982) appraises the DEA.
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combative tone of high level diplomatic exchanges, the
relations between the Attorney Generals of the United
States and Mexico have reinforced cooperative tendencies.13
The Executive did not attempt further restructuring of
the drug control organization until 1982. In that year,
President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) increased the number of
agencies involved in fighting drugs abroad by ordering the
participation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Additionally, in the wake of congressional revision of the
Posse Comitatus Act, the Department of Defense assumed a
direct support role in drug interdiction. These actions,
along with the creation of the South Florida Task Force on
Crime, represented the clearest depiction of an executive
strategy stressing enforcement. The choice of governmental
instruments reflected a penchant to characterize the drug
problem as "alien," and a menace that could most
effectively be dealt with the application of force abroad.
In particular, the South Florida Task Force's dual mission
to simultaneously combat drug smuggling and illegal
13This characterization is based on articles from the
Mexican Press in FBIS-Latin American Reoort, June 16, 1985,
p. M1 and May 26, 1987, p. Ml.
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i.migration 'urthered the perception that illegal drugs
were an unso-icited import, for which the U.S. demand was
not to blame.14
The South Florida Task Force embodied the Reagan ideal
for drug control policy. It was a unilateral multi-agency
effort, combining state and local officials with federal
agents. It relied primarily on the extensive enforcement
manpower, as opposed to significant intelligence support,
to identify suspects. Finally, although the project was
carried out domestically, its focus was on external sources
of supply. The President's portrayal of the operation as
an unqualified success would lead Congress to propose a
more widespread application of the principles involved in
1986, known as "Sealing the Border."15
The employment of a multi-agency task force to
circumvent the problem of bureaucratic "turf wars" between
14Wisotsky, p. 208.
15The "Hunter Amendment" proposed as part of the 1986
Omnibus Drug Bill called for the President to devise a plan
by which the Southwest border could be sealed to stop the
flow of drugs within 45 days. The proposal is discussed
and debated in "Controversy Over Omnibus Drug Legislation,"
Conaressional Digest, (November 1986), pp. 259-289. The
proposal spurred the development of a study by the Rand
Corporation entitled Sealina The Border, discussed
previously. The Rand Study found that the Congressional
proposal severely underestimated the costs and
overestimated the effectiveness of such a plan.
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drug enforcement agencies persisted as an executive plan of
action. In January 1983, the federal government
implemented Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces
(OCDETF) in 13 United States cities. The OCDETF combined
agents from nine federal agencies as well as state and
local officials under the supervision of U.S. attorneys.1 6
In March 1983, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System (NNBIS) began working in six point of entry cities
to coordinate the multitude of interdiction forces.17
Multi-agency coordination controlled by the federal
government proved an effective alternative to radical
centralization.
President Reagan made one more effort at executive
centralization of drug control policy in 1984, creating the
National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, but with
inconsequential results.18
16The White House, National Drua Control Strategy,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January
1990), p. 16.
17Wisotsky, p. 208.
18An evaluation of the National Drug Enforcement Policy
Board is available in the Office of Technology Assessment,
The Border War On Drugs. The fundamental weakness of the
board was its inability to exercise control over and
implement changes in interdiction policy. The board lacked
effective executive power, or power to control budget
allocations, and therefore served as nothing more than an
advisory pane.
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By late 1984, the initiative in setting the drug
control agenda shifted form the President to the Congress.
Soaring crime rates and increased public awareness of
rampant drug abuse created an outcry that the Legislative
branch could not ignore. Particularly in election years,
Congress has striven to toughen its anti-crime and anti-
drug posture. From 1984 onward, the Executive reshaped
drug policy only under precise direction or mandate from
the Congress.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AND THE EXPANSION OF THE WAR
ON DRUGS
The Congressional role in the development of drug
policy has begun to overshadow the Executive in the last
six years. Congressional participation in drug policy
formulation arose concurrently with other challenges to
executive control of foreign policy. Two important
evolutionary trends have facilitated a greater role for
Congress in matters of foreign policy. First, as evident
in drug control issues, there is a greater intermingling of
domestic and foreign policy issues to the point where it is
difficult to view policy decisions in a single realm.
Second, the creation of extensive staffs and research
bodies have effectively maximized Congressional influence
through control of funding and oversight.
The power of Congress to convene committees and
stipulate control mechanisms over foreign policy, and
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particularly external drug control policy, has vastly
expanded the bureaucracy of the drug control network.
While this has enabled the Congress to shape external drug
policy consistent with a specified code of conduct, it has
provided little to resolve the difficulty of agencies
competing for drug control funding.
Committees and subcommittees tasked with the oversight
and funding of federal agencies involved in counter-
narcotics operations have multiplied at an alarming rate.
A complex, interactive network that involves fifty-three
(53) committees and subcommittees of the House of
Representatives, and twenty-one (21) committees and
subcommittees of the Senate, have emerged to "oversee" drug
control organizations.19 Many of these groups have
overlapping jurisdiction, yet the extent of that overlap is
undetermined. Efforts to curb the growth of or to roll
back the proliferation of Congressional committees would
assuredly face stiff opposition from Congress members
clinging dearly to cherished chairmanships. Thus, Congress
has inadvertently created a major roadblock to
19Raphael Francis Perl, "The U.S. Congress,
International Drug Policy, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988," Journal of InterAmerican and World Affairs, vol. 30,
no. 2 & 3, (Summer/Fall 1988), p. 21.
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centralization of drug control agencies, above and beyond
the already debilitating rivalries between the agency
loyalists.
There is no joint committee for the overall
coordination of Senate and House of Representatives policy
on drug control. The nearest approximation to a
coordinating legislative body, the House Select Committee
on Narcotics Abuse and Control, is barred from receiving or
reporting legislative bills. With this in mind it is
interesting to note that the most progressive and
innovative proposals for drug policy came in 1988, from
Senate Democratic and Republican Task Forces, not from any
standing committee.2 0
The collective perspective of Congress on the nation's
drug problem is that the problem requires greater treatment
facilities and law enforcement capabilities domestically,
and an even greater application of legal standards abroad.
The manifestation of this outlook is traditionally tough
anti-crime measures at home, and sanctions, including
certification, to regulate the behavior of other states.
This pattern emerged in 1984, in a tough anti-crime bill,
and evolved into comprehensive anti-drug abuse acts in 1986
20Ibid., p. 22.
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and 19t.. The measures invoked in 1986 and 1988 were
facilitated by the revision of the Posse Comitatus Act
in 1981.
Congress revised the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981 to
relax restrictions, in place since Reconstruction, against
the use of military equipment and personnel for civil law
enforcement.21 The amendment of Posse Comitatus was
essentially an effort to utilize modern technology and
accessible man-hours available from the military to address
a shortage of both in drug control agencies, but it had
greater implications. In the near future the revision of
the Posse Comitatus Act would reveal a Congressional
preference for a belligerent, unilateral stance against
external suppliers of drugs and a Congressional perception
that the military would provide a more coherent framework
for interdiction.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 followed the
implementation of a more streamlined interdiction structure
on the Southwest border under Operation Alliance.22 The
program name "Alliance" erroneously conveys the impression
21See Donald Mabry, "The U.S. Military and the War on
Drugs in Latin America," Journal of InterAmerican and World
Affairs, vol. 30, no. 2 & 3, (Summer/Fall 1988), p. 56.
22Th New York Times, "U.S. Details Plan To Combat
Drugs At Mexico Border," p. Al, 14 August 1986.
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that border interdiction had acquired a bilateral,
cooperative character, when in fact the operation actually
invoked greater interagency cooperation in a U.S.
unilateral effort.2 3 Midway through the plan's sixty day
trial period, begun in August 1986, the House of
Representatives passed H.R. 5484, the "Omnibus Drug
Enforcement, Education, and Control Act of 1986.3,24
The Omnibus Drug Bill of 1986 was the most strident
assertion of congressional control over drug policy thus
far, and reflected the preferred tactics of the legislative
branch. It emphasized unilateral actions, increased use of
the military and National Guard, and coercion to ensure
international cooperation. While funding was appropriated
to handle domestic education and treatment, the majority of
assets were directed toward interdiction, eradication and
law enforcement.
The specific aspects of drug control measures aimed at
reducing the inflow of illicit drugs carried a hostile
message for Mexico. First, Congress directed the President
to report within six months on how the Armed Forces could
most effectively be use in the war on drugs. Combined with
23Ibid., p. Al.
2 4
"Controversy Over Omnibus Drug Legislation,"
Congressional Digest, (November 1986), pp. 264-288.
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increased funding for narcotics control aircraft and the
deployment of aerostat balloons on the Southwest land
border, the implications of militarization were ominous.
Second, the "Hunter amendment" passed by the House, but
rejected by the Senate, had called for a plan to "seal the
borders" militarily, with a clear emphasis on closing the
Mexican border. Third, the bill revised the "Mansfield
amendment" by allowing U.S. personnel to assist in arrests
in foreign countries where they had formerly been banned.
Finally, the Omnibus Drug Bill placed restrictions on
foreign aid, favorable U.S. votes on loans from multi-
national development banks, and trade benefits for
narcotics producing and narcotics transit countries. The
operative section of this restriction came under a process
called "certification."25 Since its inception, the
certification process has become an annual point of
friction in United States-Mexican relations.
2. Congress and "Certification",
While certification can be viewed as an effort to
apply consistent codes of conduct for U.S. aid recipients,
in the case of Mexico, the process is inclined to be
2 5The certification process, especially with regard to
Mexico, is best described by Raphael Francis Perl in "The
U.S. Congress, International Drug Policy, and the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988," Journal of InterAmerican and World
Affairs, vol. 30, no. 2 & 3, (Summer/Fall 1988), pp. 22-48.
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punitive rather than coercive. As as noted above,
Congress enacted the Omnibus Drug Bill on the heels of the
commencement of Operation Alliance. Congress was angered
by the refusal of Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid
(1982-1988) to allow "hot pursuit" of suspected air
smugglers up to 100 miles into Mexico by U.S. agents.2 6
The murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico in 1985,
the alleged torture of another DEA agent there in 1986, and
charges of corruption at the ministerial level, further
enraged and provided Congress with reasons for a
belligerent attitude toward Mexico. As one State
department observer remarked, "I've never seen so many
senators with fire in their eyes over Mexico."27 Congress
drafted the comprehensive drug bill of 1986 in this frame
of mind toward Mexico.
Since 1986, only one country has been impuned more
than once by the certification process - Mexico. In 1987,
1988, and 1989, Mexico was cited in resolutions by Congress
for decertification on the basis of non-cooperation.2 8 In
2 6President Reagan offered this proposal in meetings
with President de la Madrid, August 12-14, 1986, but the
Mexican president refused. The New York Times, August 14,
1986, p. Al.
27The New York Times, October 20, 1986, p. Al.
28Perl, p. 26.
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the language of the bill, certification requires
Presidential endorsement that a country has either
"cooperated fully" with the Untied States, or has taken
adequate steps on its own to prevent drug production,
processing, trafficking, drug-related money laundering,
bribery and public corruption.29 Mexico, historically
sensitive on issues of sovereignty with regard to the
United States, has preferred to take "adequate steps on its
own," and has incurred the wrath of Congress for its
efforts.
The certification sanctions threatened by Congress
toward Mexico are largely symbolic. In 1989, Mexico
received less than $225,000 in official U.S. aid. Because
decertification would precipitate a major rupture in
bilateral relations, the threat is a paper tiger.
Congressional disapproval of Mexican policy on drug control
in an open forum rarely achieves benefits, and often
creates enduring antagonism in a region where cooperation
is required for success. The certification process is a
major detriment to fruitful bilateral efforts.
29Raphael Francis Perl, International Narcotics Control
and Foreign Assistance Certification: Reguirements.
Procedures. Timetables and Guidelines, Report prepared
Congressional Research Service, March 1988.
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2. Progress: The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 attests to both the
continued antagonistic stance of Congress toward external
drug control and the overwhelming, pervasive growth of the
drug policy structure. Built on the foundation of the 1986
Omnibus Drug Bill, the 1988 Act contains 758 pages of new
guidelines for domestic and international programs. To its
credit, Congress devoted significant funds for domestic
education and treatment, as well as for State and local law
enforcement. However, the majority of funding is still
aimed at controlling external drug supplies, even though
the law stipulates that spending should be balanced between
supply and demand reduction programs. The emphasis of the
bill appears to be a more concise definition of areas of
responsibility for various government agencies, and clearer
guidelines for expected behavior of other countries in the
international fight against drugs.
In terms of rationalizing and centralizing the
sprawling bureaucracy, the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act created
the position of "Drug Czar".30 For the first time at the
federal level Congress undertook to transcend the limits of
3 0The idea of a coordinating drug "czar" was suggested
in a book by Scott B. MacDonald, Dancing On A Volcano,
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1988), p. 148.
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bureaucratic domains, and through the creation of the "drug
czar," empowered an office to restructure the drug control
network to effectively address the problems. As Director
of the National Drug Control Policy Board, the "drug czar"
was tasked with the identification of goals, initiatives,
and an overall strategy. The National Drug Control
Stratgyof September 1989, and its more definitive
supplement in January 1990, were evidence of a concerted
effort to rationalize the structure of drug control and
integrate its disparate parts. While the strategy itself
and the creation of new bureaucratic leader are not the
final solution to coordinating effective drug control
policy, they represent significant progress toward that
goal, and provide a focal point for the evaluation of
current tactics.
Beyond the mandate for the restructuring of the
executive drug control administration, Congress imposed
numerous other policy priority preferences in the body of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The majority of these
items direct agencies with drug control functions to carry
out specific tasks, in effect outlining the areas of
responsibility for each. While such a clarification of
roles is badly needed, the tasking codifies certain agency
roles for which they are not appropriately matched. The
question of which agency or department can best address an
issue is finally dealt with herein, albeit with the
52
continuation of some misconceived notions. Specifically of
import to the issue of illicit druc control along the
Southwest border and in Mexico, these provisions of the
bill are notable:
- calls upon the President to convene an international
conference on combatting illicit drug traffick Ig,
production, and use in the Western Hemisphere;
- calls upon the Secretary of State to consult with
heads of U.S. agencies and governments in Western
Hemisphere nations concerning the creation of a
comprehensive, integrated, multi-national plan to
combat the cocaine trade;
- calls upon the Department of State to establish a
regional anti-narcotics training center in the
Caribbean;
- changes the date of notification of Congress by
the President for those countries requiring
"certification" to 1 October each year; further
requires the president to establish numerical
standards and guidelines for determining which
countries are "drug - transit nations";
- changes determination criteria for "certification"
from the basic assessment of "cooperating fully"
or taking "adequate steps on their own" to a
foremost consideration to maximum achievable
reductions in illicit production as well as an
evaluation of
(1) steps to eliminate drug related bribery and
corruption,
(2) whether the government facilitates narcotics
production or distribution as a matter of
policy,
31A Western Hemisphere conference on cocaine production
and trafficking was held in 15 February 1990, but did not
include Mexico. See The New York Times, 10 February 1990,
p. A5.
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(3) whether any government officials are involved
in the drug trade,
(4) how cases involving violence toward U.S. drug
enforcement agents are being pursued,
(5) response to requests to assist DEA activities,
including aerial hot pursuit,
(6) how expeditiously U.S. requests for extradition
are processed,
(7) refusal to grant safe haven to known traffickers,
(8) changes in dzestic legal codes to prosecute
traffickers; J 6
directs the president to consider Mexican response to
U.S. requests to establish joint agreements on border
air apprehension and surveillance when making
certifications;
urges the government of Mexico to cooperate fully with
the United States in drug law enforcement matters,
including cases involving the murder of DEA agent
Camarena and the torture of DEA agent Cortez;
encourages the government of Mexico to furnish the
U.S. with banking information to facilitate U.S.
prosecution of narco-terr3ists who use Mexican
banks to launder profits;
While Mexico is but one of many drug producing and
drug transit countries cited in Title IV of the Act, it is
32Perl, p. 36.
33Raphael Francis Perl provides an excellent summary of
these and other provisions in "Congress, International
Narcotics Policy, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,"
Journal of InterAmerican and World Affairs, vol. 30, no.
2 & 3, pp. 22-48, as well as information from Title IV of
the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act (PL 100-690) itself.
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mentioned more often, either directly or indirectly, than
any other. The pervasive references reflect not only a
concern for drug control in the region where the majority
of U.S. bound illicit drugs transit, but also combative,
paternalistic tone. The Mexican government is directly
challenged to comply, with little room for variance from
expected behavior. Such a tone is not the best manner to
establish cooperative relations with a nation jealous of
its sovereignty.
The final product of the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988 is the United State's first National Drug Control
StrateM .34 The strategy is the product of two decades of
drug control policy failures and achievements. It
represents the best comprehensive assessment to date of
what the federal government believes will work. It
combines the mandates and directives of the Congress, with
the innovations and desires of the Executive branch. Most
important, it matches preferred agencies and departments
(the "tools") with tasks the government perceives they can
most effectively carry out.
34The National Drug Control Strategy is defined
combining the outline in The National Drug Control Strategy
of September 1989, with the specific proposals contained in
The National Drua Control Strategy, of January 1990.
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C. THE TOOLS FOR DRUG POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Inherent in the creation of the position of the Office
of Drug Control Policy and the position of "drug czar" is
the assessment that effective drug control is not plausible
if carried out within the confines of traditional
bureaucratic organizational lines. While this is an
appropriate evaluation, and an adequate start for reform,
traditional lines of authority and the battle for drug
control funds undermine coordination efforts. Until
institutions are redefined and jurisdiction placed with
agencies most appropriate for the task, drug control policy
will remain inefficient. The following is a discussion of
the primary organizations involved in drug control efforts
along the Southwest border and in Mexico, and an assessment
of the appropriateness of their tasking. Since bilateral
cooperation is fundamental to success in this region, an
evaluation of the organization's capability to work with
appropriate Mexican counterparts is also considered
valuable.
1. The Office of National Drug Control Policy
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
represents an improvement in the centralizing and
coordinating capacity of the United States government at
the highest level. The ONDCP addresses a major flaw
exposed in the Border War On Drugs study which asserted
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that "no central authority addresses important strategic
questions on priorities and resource allo ations." 35 By
virtue of its ability to recommend budget allocations, the
ONDCP surpasses all its predecessors in influence on the
scope and direction of U.S. drug control policy.
The ONDCP has already succeeded in bringing the
crucial issues of the drug policy debate into sharper focus
by compiling the National Drug Control Strategv. The
"Budget Summary" addendum to the national strategy provides
an even more concise outline of administration priorities
and objectives. Since competition for funding is at the
core of "bureaucratic turf wars," supervisory control of
the budget process is fundamental to successfully imposing
coordination.
The 1990 budget requests from the ONDCP
demonstrates a clear understanding of the value of
interdiction. In defiance of stipulations by the Congress,
the coordinating body did not attempt to balance supply and
demand reduction plans with equal funding for each.
35Office of Technology Assessment, Border War On Drugs,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 18,
1987), p. 3.
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Instead, the ONDCP recommended that 71 percent of budgeted
funds go to supply reduction programs. This imbalance was
justified for the following reasons:
a. because supply reduction activities are inherently
more expensive,
b. because supply reduction is primarily a federal
task, while demand reduction is more effective
locally, and
c. because supply reduction efforts have q impacv., a
deterrent effect, on demand reduction.
The ONDCP has the potential to bring more rational
tactics to national drug control, and benefits from its
relative autonomy from bureaucratic turf battles. The
intention to more effectively coordinate U.S. interdiction
efforts, to provide greater funding for supply reduction
programs - including foreign aid, and the ability to stand
above bureaucratic interests, are promising aspects of the
ONDCP.
2. The State Department
The State Department has been miscast as the U.S.
government's lead agency in the international fight against
illicit drugs. The multitude of important cooperative
links necessary for effective drug control is beyond the
capability for effective management of the State
36The White House, National Drua Control Strateav-
Budget SuDDlement, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, January 1990), p. 1.
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Department, especially in the case of Mexico. The pursuit
of treaties and accords, the solicitation of support for
multilateral agreements like the Vienna Convention on
Illicit Narcotics Traffic, and maintaining U.S. assistance
programs for the countries involved in the battle against
drugs, are all significant tasks for the State Department
which further U.S. drug control goals. However, the
expansion of the country's chief diplomatic arm into realm
of counter-narcotics potentially undermines cooperative
efforts. The State Department is poorly equipped to
supervise drug law enforcement and to assist the conduct
drug raids, as it has attempted to do in recent times.
Several decades ago, the problem of international
drug trafficking was small enough that it could effectively
be dealt with as a collateral duty of the U.S. embassy in
most countries. Present national drug control strategy
calls for the establishment of a "fully dedicated Narcotics
Control Coordinator" to oversee all U.S. support efforts in
host countries.37  This is an admission that the task has
become too large to manage for the State Department. The
assignment of embassy personnel to assist law enforcement
and even paramilitary operations is misguided. It creates
37The White House, National Drug Control Strategy,
p. 58.
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a destructive conflict of interest for the State
Department, particularly in Latin America where its chief
function is to allay fears of U.S. intervention. Moreover,
the conduct of drug operations supervised by the State
Department has been criticized, especially its "poor
management" of anti-drug air assets.3 8 Notoriously fragile
United States-Mexican diplomatic relations are needlessly
jeopardized by the active participation of State Department
personnel in drug operations.
To maintain that the United States intends to
respect the sovereign nations in the battle against drugs,
the State Department must remain a detached observer. The
State Department can serve a far more valuable function by
advocating economic assistance to help rural populations
find alternatives to drug cultivation than by coordinating
the eradication of illegal crops. The diplomatic mission
should be, particularly in the case of Mexico, to find ways
to support the host country in alleviating the problem
itself, not to supplant the government in drug control.
3. The Department of Justice
Drug control is a law enforcement function, in the
United States and abroad, despite the agencies used to
augment enforcement officials. Relations between the
38San Francisco Chronicle, June 14, 1990, p. B1.
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Attorneys General of Mexico and the United States represent
more closely than any other intergovernmental activity the
kind of cooperation necessary to achieve desired results.
Despite the ongoing controversy surrounding the DEA in
Mexico and the Camarena affair, cooperation between law
enforcement officials holds the greatest promise of
conquering the menace posed by drug trafficking.39
Forums like the International Drug Enforcement
Conference and the International Narcotics Enforcement
Officers Association are two examples of informal legal
organizations working to forge an international consensus
on the dangers of illicit drug traffic. Participation by
officials of the DEA, FBI and other Justice Department
agents fortify the image of the United States within these
groups.
While the DEA has received considerable criticism
for its renegade behavior concerning the Camarena affair,
DEA efforts are helping to strengthen Mexican legal
institutions. The Justice Department fully understands
that its function, using the DEA, is to help other
39The Camarena Affair refers to the murder of DEA agent
Enrique Camarena in March 1985. Subsequent efforts by both
governments to prosecute those involved in the murder have
caused tension. The DEA, in particular, has been
frustrated with the slow pace of the investigation by the
Mexican government. For more information, see MacDonald,
Dancina On A Volcano, pp. 77-80.
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countries fight drugs themselves. Future U.S. drug control
policy should use a limited number of DEA agents and a
greater amount of U.S. funds to support international law
enforcement.
4. The Department of Defense
The U.S. military has frequently been the tool of
U.S. unilateral actions in the western hemisphere, and
therefore the participation of the military in drug control
efforts has alarmed many Latin American governments. The
military can significantly enhance not only U.S.
interdiction efforts, but also those of drug plagued
countries like Mexico. The choice to employ the military
in drug control is a good one, provided that military
leaders restrict efforts to support roles.
The Congress initially brought the military into
drug control operations in order to bring additional
surveillance equipment and sensors. The infrastructure to
regulate the employment of that equipment has grown into
the most efficient coordinating mechanism to date - the
Joint Task Force structure. The three regional Joint Task
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previously chaotic and dysfunctional patchwork of federal,
state, and local interdictien forces.
4 0
The greatest contribution the military has made to
stopping the flow of illegal drugs is the enhancement of
intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination.41 Air
and maritime surveillance platforms have helped create a
clearer picture of trafficking patterns, allowing the
United States and Mexico to more adequately deploy
interdicting forces.
While the employment of the armed forces may have
the beneficial effect of demonstrating a stronger
commitment to stopping drug trafficking, there are inherent
dangers in involving the armed forces in law enforcement.
Within the United States there is a fear that the military
may be used domestically against U.S. citizens. Abroad
there is fear of intervention.
Concern about U.S. intervention has been fueled by
two recent events. First, the congressional debate
concerning the 1986 Omnibus Drug Bill was so emotionally
charged that it led to consideration of a plan to
4 0The Joint Task Force concept is explained in Lt.
Charley L. Diaz, USCG, "DOD Plays In The Drug War,"
Proceedings, Naval Review 1990, p. 78. The three JTF's are
headquartered in Key West, Florida (JTF-4), Alameda,
California (JTF-6), and El Paso, Texas (JTF-5).
41Ibid., p. 80.
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militarily close the Southwest border. More recently, a
second shock wave of intervention fears was launched by the
disclosure of a plan advocated by General Maxwell Thurman
for a "hemispheric drug raid."42 Both plans represent the
worst possible course of action, and fundamentally miss the
importance of cooperative rather than unilateral action.
Thurman's plan, a hemispheric drug raid using U.S.
equipment and support structure to enable Latin American
troops to launch a broad assault on drug traffickers, is a
misguided proposition. As one critic noted, it is the kind
of "high profile operation that will revive memories of
U.S. imperialism."43 The danger in General Thurman's plan
is that if carried out, it could do more to destabilize and
undermine the legitimacy of Latin American governments than
any degree of narcoterrorism. Discussion of such matters
sabotages cooperative endeavors and renews suspicion of the
true intent of U.S. military forces in interdiction. U.S.
policy makers must be alert to the dangers of using the
military, and adopt adequate measures to restrain military
intervention. Policy priorities must be clear and well
defined before the military is assigned a larger role.
4 2
"Risky Business," Newsweek, July 16, 1990, p.16.
4 3Ibid., p. 16.
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U.S. policy makers have found a well organized,
capable and energetic coordinating agency to maximize the
interdiction efforts of all national assets in the
military. To the extent that the military is confined to
the support role of detection and monitoring, it will
enhance both interdiction and cooperative efforts. A more
coordinated and efficient U.S. interdiction framework
bolsters the perception of U.S. determination abroad.
5. The Department of the Treasury
The Treasury does not have a long history of
working in a cooperative international framework, but the
redoubled efforts of the Customs Office and the new
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) give the
Treasury a larger role in fighting international drug
trafficking.44 Customs will share responsibility with the
DEA for restricting the flow of chemicals used in the
production of illicit drugs, and FINCEN will cooperate with
foreign governments to track down money launderers. Both
of these measures address shortcomings in U.S. drug control
that have been ciued as demonstrations of laxity by drug
producing and transit states. The Treasury's expanded
44The White House, National Drug Control Stratev,
p. 61.
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responsibilities boost cooperative ventures by
demonstrating U.S. resolve to take care of its part of the
problem.
6. Intelligence Agencies
Perhaps the greatest improvement offered by the
National Drug Control Strategv is the attention given to
improving intelligence activities. U.S. drug control
policy has been severely hindered by proposals based on
inadequate information. Moreover, intelligence sharing
offers the best method of cheaply enhancing the drug
fighting capabilities of friendly governments.
The establishment of a National Drug Intelligence
Center is a major step toward eliminating a barrier to
greater interagency cooperation domestically. A national
intelligence center which disseminates information for the
purpose of upgrading overall enforcements efforts will
assist in the breakdown of bureaucratic barriers.
Intelligence in the domain of a non-partisan agency ensures
that intelligence will be used by all who need it, and not
withheld for parochial interests. "A coordinated
interagency campaign such as the drug war requires a
certain amount of intelligence sharing" to be effective.45
4 5Diaz, "DOD Plays In The Drug War," p. 81.
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Similarly, the sharing of intelligence across
national borders will assist the cooperative drug effort.
Accepting intelligence from the U.S. allows governments
like Mexico to benefit discreetly from the abundant
resources available to the United States. The prudent
sharing of intelligence can help the Mexican government
fight its own drug battle, and the Legal Issues Working
Group provides for this type of arrangement.
D. U.S. POLICY AND CONSTRAINTS
U.S. policy still has room for improvement through the
evolutionary process of bureaucratic politics to achieve a
rational, coordinated drug control policy. The battle
between the President and the Congress for control of
international drug control policy, a penchant for
unilateral action, and a propensity to miscast certain
government agencies in drug fighting roles, all work
against the development of the cooperative and integrated
policy necessary to effectively confront drug trafficking.
The National Drua Control Strategy represents
significant progress toward establishing goals and defining
priorities on the international agenda. The development of
that strategy and the major initiatives contained within it
to address the international aspects of the problem have
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been the focus of this chapter. Important underlying
assumptions and apparent discontinuities emerged from this
inspection.
Foremost among drug policy objectives is the creation
of a more coherent and efficient government framework
within which to combat illicit drugs. The rationalization
and expansion of U.S. efforts has important ramifications
for future cooperation. It demonstrates a firm resolve on
the part of the United States to devote as much energy to
solving its own problem as it is pursuing in other nations.
The strategy acknowledges that interdiction is a major
component of drug control policy. Dissatisfying results
from interdiction to date are not solely the product of
poor programs in drug producing countries, but reflect the
inefficiency of U.S. efforts as well. Effective drug
policy should address enhancing enforcement in the United
States as well as abroad.
Some government agencies still maintain roles they are
poorly equipped to carry out. Others must be effectively
supervised to ensure they do not overstep their mission.
U.S. policy still requires a more concise and pragmatic
definition of each agency's tasking.
The United States can not fight the drug problem alone.
Direct intervention has the potential to destroy friendly
governments and will not necessarily achieve desired
results. The strategy asserts that cooperative endeavors
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must be the foundation of supply reduction, to which should
added that the respect for the sovereignty of other
countries is paramount. U.S. policy falls well short on
enhancing the legitimacy of cooperative governments and
providing discreet support for bolstering host government
institutions. Punitive measures like the certification
process detract from policy aims and should be abandoned.
The reorientation of U.S. drug control policy is a
hopeful sign for cooperative international drug policy.
The ability of the U.S. government to set priorities for,
and foster cooperation among, its own bureaucracies
demonstrates an indefatigable will to make drug control
work.
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III. MEXICAN PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY
Unlike the United States, Mexico does not have an
overwhelming consensus for an intensified effort to combat
illicit drugs. Mexico confronts a radically different
"drug problem" than the United States, and Mexican drug
control efforts are constrained even more by the volatility
of the domestic political environment. Mexico does not
have a domestic drug abuse problem of the same relative
magnitude as the United States. The threat of drug
trafficking in the Mexican view is most perilous in the
manner in which it represents a challenge to the legitimacy
of the government. Narco-corruption and narco-terrorism
have the potential of destabilizing the fragile Mexican
government in a period of transition toward a more open
democratic regime.1
The Mexican government characterizes Mexico as a victim
of the drug trade,2 an unwilling transit state caught
1Richard B. Craig, "Mexican Narcotics Traffic:
Binational Security Implications," in Donald J. Mabry, ed.
The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National
Security, (Westport, Connecticut: The Greenwood Press,
1990), pp. 29-31.
2Statement by Mexican Attorney General Garcia Ramirez
in "Mexico and the Narcotics Traffic: A Growing Strain in
Relations," The New York Times, October 20, 1986, p. A6.
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between United States demand and South American supply in
the frame, #rk of international drug activity. This
assertion is based on tuo perceptions. First, the Mexican
government does not see evidence of rapidly rising domestic
demand for illegal drugs.3 Second, although Mexico is a
significant producer of heroin and marijuana, the Mexican
government publicly proclaims it is satisfied with domestic
control efforts to curb production. Officially, the
Mexican government believes that further reductions in
overall drug trafficking are the responsibility of consumer
nations, since "drug traffic in Mexico derives from
increasing consumption in the industrialized nations."4
Mexico's preeminent concerns about illicit drug control
stem from the destabilizing influence of narco-dollars,
narco-corruption, and the perceived links between drug
traffickers and insurgents.5 Drug control is a delicate
3This official view was expressed by the chairman of
the Justice Committee of the Mexican Legislature, Deputy
David Jimenez Gonzales in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) - Latin American Report, October 24, 1986,
p. M1. A similar assertion was made by the Attorney
General's Office in Jesus Yanez Orozco, "The Fight Against
Drug Trade," Voices of Mexico (September-November 1986,
no. 1), p. 56.
4Statement of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988)
in "The Fight Against Drug Trade," Voices of Mexico, p. 57.
5Mark S. Steinitz, "Insurgents, Terrorists, and The
Drug Trade," Washington Ouarterlv, volume 8, no. 4 (Fall
1985), p. 47.
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political issue in that it represents an additional strain
on a corporatist authoritarian regime in transition.
Having already alienated traditional sectors of political
support by choosing an economic development plan anchored
by privatization, and continuously plagued by allegations
of electoral fraud, the Mexican government must proceed
cautiously in its battle against drugs for fear of driving
loyal and semiloyal opposition into the ranks of the
disloyal.6 The constraints on Mexican drug control are not
the product of challenges from within the government, but
from pressure outside it.
Since the mid-1930s when the precursor of the
Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) consolidated
Mexico's social revolution, Mexico has been ruled by one
party. The absolute domination of the PRI in federal and
local elections since that time has led to the
characterization of Mexico as a "state-corporatist
6The terms loyal, semiloyal and disloyal opposition
refer to political participation behavior of opposition
groups under different regimes. They are defined in Juan
J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Reaimes: Crisis.
Breakdown & Reeguilibration. (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 27-38.
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authoritarian"7 or "inclusionary authoritarian"8 regime.
The PRI maintained its political dominance throughout the
period prior to the late 1970's by adhering to a
nationalistic, state controlled economic development plan
and the distribution of patronage and rewards to its
sectors of political support - the agrarian, urban labor
and popular sectors. Economic development and political
patronage were the foundations of PRI legitimacy.
The viability of Mexico's chosen economic development
model - import substitution industrialization - came into
question in the early 1970's. As growth slowed and crisis
emerged, it was quickly postponed by the oil boom in the
mid-1970's. The infusion of petroleum revenue and
increased foreign lending allowed the PRI to continue to
subsidize rewards for urban labor and agrarian support.9
However, the worldwide recession and international debt
crisis of the late 1970's irrevocably damaged Mexico's
revolutionary model of independent development.
7Howard J. Wiarda, "Mexico: The Unravelling of a
Corporatist Regime?" Journal of InterAmerican Studies and
World Affairs, volume 30, no. 4, (Winter 1988-1989), p. 3.
8Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Liberalization in an
Authoritarian Regime," in Judith Gentleman, ed., Mexican
Politics in Transition, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview,
1987), p. 17.
9judith A. Teichman, Policy making in Mexico: From
Boom to Crisis, (Boston, Massachusetts: Allen & Unwin,
1988), p. 40.
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The PRI then made the difficult political choice of
abandoning the "revolutionary" economic model in favor of a
more free market oriented approach. The gradual shift meant
that the PRI would represent the interests of technocratic
elites and the middle class more than those of the urban
labor and agrarian sectors. 10 The political gamble was
premised on the calculation that economic development would
occur rapidly enough to allow traditional sectors of support
to experience the benefits before they became disenchanted
or alienated. To date, the risk has been narrowly
successful, as the PRI retains political power, despite the
erosion of traditional political support. However, the
narrowing margin of victory in disputed elections in 1982
and 198811 demonstrates that the PRI has little room for
political error until economic success can be declared.
This prevailing political climate permeates all facets of
Mexican drug control policy.
As Mexico moves away from the economic foundation of the
Constitution of 1917, adherence to all other aspirations of
the revolution that prompted the Constitution
10Latin American Regional Reports - Mexico and Central
Amicn, (RM-89-05), May 4, 1989, p. 6.
1 1Leopoldo Gomez & Joseph L. Klesner, "Mexico's 1988
Elections: The Beginning of a New Era of Mexican Politics?"
LJFrm, volume XIX, no. 3, 1988, discusses rise of
electoral opposition to the PRI.
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to become even more significant. Political challenges from
the left call attention to all aspects of PRI policy which
appear to be diversions from revolutionary objectives. The
political left in Mexico seeks to assume the mantle of
protectors of the revolution in the hopes of garnering
electoral support. Of specific emotional and political
value are assertions that the PRI is surrendering, or
"selling out," carefully nurtured Mexican autonomy in
global affairs. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the spokesperson,
leader and presidential candidate for the leftist
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) has written recently:
The Salinas government's unprecedented subordination of
Mexico's national interests to American preferences is at
work in several areas - ranging from drugs to
industrialization and pollution - all of which are
crucial to the success of Salinas' programs for econylic
modernization and integration with the U.S. economy.
Mexican drug control policy must foremost maintain the
appearance of autonomy. The spectre of paternalism and
intervention from the United States strongly influences
Mexican domestic and foreign policy decisions. Especially
in an era when President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-
present) is pursuing a controversial free trade agreement
with the United States, the political opposition is
vigilant for signs of subjugation by Mexico's northern
12Cuauhtemoc Card ;%as, "Misunderstanding Mexico,"
Foreign Policy, 78, (Spring 1990), p. 113.
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neighbor. Since the end of the Mexican Revolution, Mexico
has careful nurtured a political identity distinct in its
defiance of United States coercion and influence. The
perception that the will to maintain this revolutionary
ideal is eroding could be disastrous for the PRI.
At this point in Mexico's political and economic
transition, greater cooperation with the United States is
looked upon as anathema. The adoption of drug control
measures that in any manner reflect a subservience of
Mexican needs to those of the United States involves
inordinate political risks and limited returns.13 In many
ways, however, Mexican drug control policy does support
U.S. aims. Ironically Mexico flatly denies the idea that
its efforts could be enhanced with greater United States
support, mostly because it is politically untenable. As
has been asserted by Celia Toro, Mexico is fighting to
13This view is expressed by Samuel I. del Villar, "The
Illicit United States-Mexico Drug Market: Failure of
Policy and an Alternative," in Riordan Roett, ed.,
Mexico and the United States: Managing the Relationship,
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), p. 198. More
recently, this opinion was expressed in an editorial
entitled "U.S. Accused of Seeking Legalized Intervention"
reprinted in FBIS-Latin American Report, April 11, 1988,
p. 12.
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preserve its autonomy in drug control to avoid both
clientelism and anarchy.14
A. POLICY FORMULATION - THE AVOIDANCE OF CLIENTELISM
AND ANARCHY
The Mexican government recognizes that not only is
controlling drug trafficking a significant policy problem,
but the manner in which drug control is pursued represents
some politically significant problems as well. In order to
serve the linked objectives of restoring the rule of law
and concurrently enhancing the political legitimacy of the
PRI, Mexican drug control efforts must succeed nearly
autonomously.
In light of these dual objectives, whether the Mexican
government could benefit by increased Untied States
assistance is irrelevant to Mexican policy makers. As
threatening as drug corruption, terrorism and insurgency
may be, they are not as certain a threat to regime
stability as is posed by the political backlash of
perceived submissiveness to the United States. Mexico does
not desire to be, and can not afford the perception of
being, a United States client in the war on drugs.
14Presentation by doctoral candidate Celia Toro
entitled "Mexican Drug Control Policy," at Stanford
University, May 24, 1990.
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This policy stance does not indicate that the Mexican
government is averse to U.S. assistance, rather it
emphasizes Mexico's sensitivity about popular perception of
regime strength. For reasons of political stability,
Mexico desires as much cooperation with the United States
as can be achieved discreetly. This stance is apparent in
public denials concerning the role of DEA agents in Mexico
and more recent outrage concerning U.S. disclosure of joint
anti-drug operations the Mexican government wanted kept
secret.1
5
The Mexican government understands that a failure to
address the lawlessness in remote states where drug
cultivation and trafficking thrive can lead to anarchy. It
is concerned about the corrupting influence of narcotics
money and armed resistance to the rule of law. President
Salinas has proclaimed that drug traffickers represent a
"top priority for our (Mexico's) national security,"16 but
this declaration reflects a greater sympathy with the
problems of Colombia than with the United States.
15President Salinas publicly complained about the
publication of details of a joint United States-Mexican
border interdiction operation at an Organization of
American States conference on illicit drug use. Los
Anaeles Times, April 20, 2990, cited in Information
Services - Latin America, #1888.
16
"Salinas Vows To Eliminate Drug Trafficking,"
FBIS-Latin American Report, March 1, 1988, p. 10.
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Colombia's internal political stability crisis has been
greatly exacerbated by violent opposition to the
government's willingness to extradite drug traffickers to
the United States. Mexico's war on drugs is inextricably
linked to political stability, and modern Mexican
revolutionary tradition mandates that the Mexican government
fight it alone. This crucial demand is evident in policy
statements by President Salinas which emphasize that the
principal responsibility for the struggle against narcotics
traffic inside the country lies with his own government.17
B. ARTICULATING THE INTERESTS
Were Mexico a more "democratic state," it is conceivable
that the public policy debate would reflect the popular
Mexican impression that the drug problem is exacerbated by
external consumer demand. Instead, much of the criticism of
Mexican drug control policy has little impact on final
decisions, since the opposition is virtually voiceless.
17President Salinas has reiterated this long standing
tenet of Mexican drug policy in virtually every official
statement. It is referred to on the occassion of Mexican
ratification of the United Nations Convention on Illegal
Narcotics Traffic in his speech reprinted in FBIS-Latin
American ReDort, December 1988, p. 10.
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The Constitution of 1917 centralizes exceptional powers
in the hands of the executive. The legislature rarely
rejects presidentially initiated legislation and has never
overridden a presidential veto. The courts are similarly
impotent, with no legal tradition of judicial review except
in matters of individual rights. Mexican drug control
policy exists, therefore, as articulated by the executive.
C. THE CHOSEN TOOLS FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Mexico combats illicit drug production and trafficking
with two major organs of the federal government, the
Mexican armed forces and Mexican Federal Judicial Police
(MFJP). In December 1988, President Salinas created a
special assistant Attorney General's office with exclusive
responsibility of coordinating an expanded program against
drug trafficking.18 Sixty percent of the Attorney
General's budget and twenty-five percent of the armed
forces manpower is dedicated to the government's permanent
campaign against drug trafficking. 19 Since federal
government structure imposes few constraints on the size
and scope of drug control operations, the true constraints
18FBIS-Latin American Report, January 3, 1989, p. 14.
19Jacqueline Buswell, "Crackdown On Drug Trafficking,"
Voices of Mexico, September-November 1989, p. 29.
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on these enforcement organizations are financial and
political. In fiscal terms, every peso diverted from
social and economic development programs to cover drug
control efforts carries enormous political costs. With a
foreign debt of over fifty percent of Gross Domestic
Product, and a strict economic austerity plan in place, the
decision to increase the 1989 budget to fight drug
trafficking 174 percent above 1988 funding levels indicates
that the program is a high priority.20 Additionally, the
costs of social disruption, and the appearance of
repression associated with the energetic pursuit of drug
producers and traffickers is a restraining influence on the
use of force in these endeavors. Despite increasing
budgetary support and manpower enhancement, the two
organizations chosen by the Mexican government must be
delicate in the handling of eradication and interdiction.
D. AN EVOLVING STRATEGY
Increased efforts against Mexican domestic drug
production began to emerge in the late 1960's, as United
States demand spurred marijuana and heroin production.
More the result of interdependence than actual coercion,
20
"Drug Fight To Cost 122 Billion Pesos in 1989"
FBIS-Latin American Report, April 11, 1989, p. 13.
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Mexican efforts were influenced by increased United States
interdiction operations on the border.21 Mexico had
maintained a small scale eradication program prior to
1974,22 but Mexico's permanent campaign against drugs
launched in that year represented a new evaluation of the
threat posed by drug traffic.
Initially Mexico's permanent campaign had a strong
bilateral character, conceptually an outgrowth of Operation
Cooperation launched by the United States. In the first
years of the program, Mexico solicited advice from and
consulted with U.S. officials.23 Mexico used U.S.
financial assistance to build up a fleet of aircraft to
conduct aerial spraying, accepted U.S. weapons and
training, and allowed a small number of DEA agents to
advise Mexican officials. However, the appeal of expanded
drug control operations was not solely the improvement of
21A different perspective on U.S. influence is offered
by Richard B. Craig in "Mexican Narcotics Traffic:
Binational Security Implications," p.29.
22A detailed accounting of Mexican drug control efforts
in the twentieth century can be found in William 0. Walker,
III, Drug Control in the Americas, (Revised Edition),
(Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press,
1989). For the period immediately prior to the permanent
campaign, see pp. 188-190.
23Richard B. Craig, "Operation Condor: Mexico's Anti-
Drug Campaign Enters a New Era," Journal of InterAmerican
Studies and World Affairs, vol. 22, no. 3, (August 1980),
p. 346-347.
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bilateral relations, but involved the more immediate goal
of restoring government authority to remote regions. It
was on this pretext that Mexico undertook its most
effective eradication effort - Operation Condor.
Operation Condor involved the Mexican military and the
MFJP. Condor was initially valuable from the Mexican
perspective because it not only produced results which
appeased the United States, but it also restored the rule
of law to the renagade states of Sinaloa, Durango, and
Chihuahua.24 Prior to intervention by Mexican military and
justice officials under Operation Condor, Sinaloa was
virtually under the rule of traffickers.
The framework of Operation Condor has been applied in
several other areas, but rarely have the results been
replicated. In part, the eradication effort in the plan
enticed the Mexican government because it delicately
managed a dual purpose. The Mexican government, using the
military and the MFJP, has been particularly energetic in
drug control operations which help restore government
political control in remote regions.
Another appealing aspect of the permanent campaign is
the manner in which it facilitated the strengthening of
ties between the PRI and the seldom used military. The
241bid., p. 352.
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military is a critical ally to any Latin American
government, especially in times of political instability.
2 5
The decision to employ the military in extensive rural
eradication programs has specific utility and political
implication beyond enhancing manpower. As noted above, the
military has been particularly useful in quelling political
opposition in areas which coincidentally encompass large
drug production networks.26 This is particularly evident
in the strongholds of drug traffickers in the states of
Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, and also of the political
Left in the southwestern Mexican states of Michoacan,
Guerrero and Oaxaca.
Often referred to as the Mexican "badlands,"27
Michoacan, Guerrero and Oaxaca have been the setting for
the most virulent political violence erupting from
25The issue of political loyalty of the Mexican
Military in times of political instability is addressed in
David Ronfeldt, ed., The Modern Mexican Military: a
Reassessment, (La Jolla, California: Center for United
States-Mexican Studies, 1984). The overall influence of
the military in Latin American politics is discussed in
Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson & Juan Rial, eds.,
The Military and Democracy, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath, 1990), especially pp. 229-232.
26San Francisco Chronicle, April 6, 1990, Briefing
p. 4.
27Financial Times, February 8, 1990, cited in
Information Services Latin America, #673.
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allegations of PRI electoral fraud. The region also has
numerous isolated airstrips used for narcotics drops and
significant domestic marijuana production. Political
repression and government pursuit of illicit drug producers
are frequently intermixed in these regions,28 further
polarizing Mexican perspectives on drug control. These
incidents have prompted the first human rights violations
report ever compiled against the Mexican government by the
Washington Office of Latin America.29
For the Mexican government, the connection between
illicit drug traffic, illegal guns, political opposition
and insurgency appear as a very real threat. As early as
1977, United States officials conveyed the concerns of
Mexican federal agents regarding the linkage between drugs
and weapons. In testimony before the United States
Congress, the disclosures that a significant portion of
drug traffickers were engaged in trading illicit drugs of
Mexican origin for illegally obtained United States weapons
28Latin American Regional Report - Mexico and Central
America, (RM-90-03), March 29, 1990, p. 6.
29
"Drug Raids Called Fake," San Francisco Chronicle,
July 18, 1990, p. A13.
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confirmed that Mexican worries had justification.30 The
drug trade had serious implications for the monopoly on the
use of force held by the PRI as government.
The impact of armed opposition has been dramatic,
drastically raising the human costs of drug control in
Mexico. In as statement on the anti-drug campaign in
September 1986, President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988)
claimed that "since Operation Condor began, the army has
suffered 392 casualties."31 Mexican drug confiscation
statistics released periodically by the Attorney General's
Office feature not only arrests, but also weapons
confiscated and government casualties.32 The choice of
government tools to prosecute a war on drugs in Mexico
therefore reflects an assessment of drug traffickers as a
political foe rather than a social ill. Mexico in a sense
is engaged in a low level counter-insurgency campaign.
30Arms for drugs trade was first discussed in 1977 in
United States Congress, Senate, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Government Operations, "Illicit Traffic in Weapons and
Drugs Across the United States-Mexican Border," 95th
Congress, 1st session, January 12, 1977, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1977).
31From a speech by President Miguel de la Madrid cited
as "Views On Anti-Drug Campaign, DEA Activities" in FBIS-
Latin American Report, September 3, 1986, p. Ml.
3 2Drug campaign seizures and arrests are reported
monthly, yearly and at other periodic intervals from
statistics compiled by the Mexican Attorney General and
can be found in FBIS-Latin American Report.
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Controlling the erosion of government control and
legitimacy is also the primary aim of President Salinas'
anti-corruption campaign. The MFJP plays a leading role in
this effort, along with the auditors of the Comptroller
General. The corrupting influence of an estimated 2.6
billion dollars33 of drug income annually generated by
smuggling reaches the highest levels of government.
Allegations against former PRI deputies and even Mexico's
defense secretary, General Juan Arevelo de Gardoqui, detail
the pervasive nature of corruption.34 Narco-corruption
"has seriously undermined the government's credibility" in
all its endeavors.35 Curtailing this aspect of drug
trafficking is of utmost concern to the administration of
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and may well impact on
the future viability of the PRI as a legitimate government.
3. POLICY CONSTRAINTS
Mexico's drug control strategy is apparently only
remotely linked to United States drug control policy.
33Figures cited represent extrapolations from reported
revenues in the Office of Technology Assessment, The Border
War On Drugs, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, March 1987).
34
"Informer Ties Top Mexican to Drug Deals,"
Washington Post, June 4, 1988, p. 1.
35"Mexico And The Narcotics Traffic, New York Times,
October 20, 1986, p. A6.
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Whereas Mexican drug control policy is centralized and
tailored to maintain a delicate political stability, United
States policy is more decentralized and less violently
opposed. The PRI and President Salinas do not enjoy the
freedom of mass consensus in favor of strict enforcement,
nor are the resources for a huge expansion of counter-
trafficking efforts readily available. Most important for
United States concerns, the Mexican government can ill
afford the appearance of needing assistance to handle a
domestic problem. Appeals to the United States for
assistance, or greater cooperation with the United States
which appears to surrender Mexican sovereignty, carry the
potential of unifying political opposition and upsetting
the delicate political balance maintaining the PRI.
Finally, Mexico sees the problem as an external one,
blaming the consumer demand of the United States and the
stepped up interdiction elsewhere in Latin America for
forcing an upsurge in drug activity in Mexico. Overt
cooperation is an unlikely senario given the political
instability of Mexico's regime in transition.
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IV. ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION IN DRUG CONTROL
Although both the United States and Mexico are engaged
in drug control described as essential to national
security, there are few examples of successful cooperation
on this issue of shared priority. The inability of both
governments to define mutually agreeable objectives and to
employ suitable organizations for the attainment of common
goals has undermined the limited attempts at bilateral
cooperation.
Factors that combine to inhibit the adoption of
conventional cooperative frameworks include historical
Mexican suspicion of United States intervention, a
reluctance by Mexico to be viewed as the subordinate ally
of the United States at a time of political instability, a
United States penchant for unilateral action, and different
perceptions of threat posed by drug trafficking.
Ironically, a cooperative approach is reluctantly
acknowledged by both nations as the best solution. The
potentially disastrous effects of unchecked illicit drug
trafficking urges that a cooperative solution be found.
As discussed, United States policy making structural
constraints and the rigidity imposed on Mexican policy
options by political volatility limit the avenues for
cooperation. The failure of certain past efforts also
defines additional constraints. An analysis of the limited
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success and the abundant failures of previous interactive
drug control policy involving Mexico and the United States
is useful for defining the parameters of future policy. By
examining binational policy initiatives of the past in the
areas of eradication, interdiction, intelligence sharing,
as well as agreed upon aspects of bilateral and
multilateral accords, plausible policy proposals for future
planning can be determined.
A. ERADICATION EFFORTS
Eradication initially appears to be solely a Mexican
unilateral issue, despite growing domestic production in
the United States. Upon closer examination, the reduction
of supply is of concern to both the producer and the
consumer nation. A helpful guideline is that both the
producer and consumer nation share an equal burden for the
presence of, and therefore the destruction of, illicit
drugs at the source.
Mexico has engaged in eradication programs throughout
the twentieth century to curtail opium and marijuana
growing, although the intensity of these efforts has
expanded greatly since 1975. In contrast, U.S. policy has
fluctuated unpredictably. While Mexican eradication
efforts have been hindered largely by intractable
constraints like corruption of officials acting in a
oversight capacity and the political unpopularity of
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eradication with rural populations, the intermittent
disapproval of United States policy makers is probably the
most easily removed constraint on eradication efforts.
Since 1970's, Mexican eradication efforts have steadily
increased in terms of manpower dedicated to the task and
government funds appropriated and the application of more
uncompromising tactics. Following the abandonment of
Operation Intercept by the United States in 1967, Mexico
took advantage of the offers of financial and equipment
assistance as part of Operation Cooperation in 1968 to
launch the first stage of permanent campaigns against
illicit drugs. Whereas Operation Intercept floundered
because it was unilateral, inefficient and did not solicit
the support of the Mexican government,1 Operation
Cooperation prospered because it was a truly bilateral
undertaking.
Operation Intercept, launched in September 1969, was
the first exercise of coercion and militarization of the
border. Viewed by some as "economic blackmail"2 on the
part of the United States, the plan in fact demonstrated
1Richard B. Craig, "Mexican Narcotics Traffic:
Binational Security Implications," in Donald Mabry, ed.,
The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National




that the sudden and erratic implementation of a de facto
land blockade was both ineffective and expensive.3
Contrastingly, Operation Cooperation employed the
consistent will and resources available on both sides of
the border to achieve more desirable results at a lesser
cost.
Several components of Operation Cooperation made the
program an attractive proposition for the Mexican
government. It allowed Mexico to bolster its international
image, provided the opportunity for the restoration of
central government authority in the renegade states of
Sinolao, Durango and Chihuahua, and offered significant
gains in United States-Mexican relations without
concessions of political sovereignty. By providing
helicopters and guns, chemical herbicides and defoliants
and funds for training Mexican officials by the Drug
Enforcement Agency, the United States earned the willing
support it was unable to gain through coercion.
In 1975 and early 1976, Mexico capitalized on the
impetus of the cooperative framework to launch its
"permanent campaign" against drugs, highlighted by the
3The U.S. government reportedly spent $30 million in
the three weeks Operation Intercept was in effect.
Additionally, there was no discernible increase in drug
seizures, nor was any change in the street price of drugs
noted. See Walker, Drug Control In The Americas, p. 192.
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implementation of Operation Condor.4 Operation Condor was
the most unrestrained eradication operation ever conducted
by the Mexican government. With a budget of $35 million
and employing the coordinated efforts of the Justice
Department and the army, Operation Condor achieved
unparalleled success in reducing the Mexican percentage of
United States heroin market and the purity of that heroin.5
Critical to the success of Operation Condor was the
cooperative interdiction efforts of United States and
Mexican drug agents. Information exchange and cooperative
training by the DEA of Mexican federal police officers
resulted in increased conspiracy cases against drug
traffickers in both countries. A United States Department
of Justice press release stated that "no single
international effort now underway is doing more to combat
heroin trafficking than the Mexican Government's
eradication program."6
4Richard B. Craig, "Operation Condor," Journal of
InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 22, no. 3
(August 1980), p. 347.
5U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the
Committee on the Judiciary, "The Mexican Connection," 95th
Congress, 2nd session, February 10 and April 19, 1978,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978),
p. 45.
6Craig, "Operation Condor," p. 349.
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Operation Condor was retained as an integral part of
Mexico's permanent campaign against drug trafficking
through the 1970's, although the startling reductions of
1976 have never been matched. After the initial success,
large concentrations of poppy fields were not to be found.
The dispersal of illicit growing made eradication more
difficult and may account for statistical decreases.
7
However, the beneficial aspects of Operation Condor were
eventually undermined, not by declining statistics, but by
doubts on both sides about the sincerity of drug efforts on
the other side of the border.
Mexico became suspicious of United States will to
pursue drug eradication with the introduction of 1978 of
the Percy amendment to the Security Assistance Act of 1961.
The Percy amendment, in reaction to the physical harm posed
to United States marijuana consumers by the herbicide
paraquat8 prohibited funding for any marijuana eradication
7This is the assessment of DEA administrator Peter B.
Bensinger, cited in U.S. Congress, Senate, "The Mexican
Connection," p. 122.
8For more insight on the controversy concerning the use
of paraquat see Jesse Kornblutz, "Paraquat and the
Marijuana War," The New York Times Magazine, August 13,
1978.
94
employi-g herbicide likely to harm users or growers.
9
These actions, coupled with President James E. Carter
(1976-1980) alleged personal view in support of the
decriminalization of marijuana, reinforced the Mexican
suspicion that the United States was not interested in
taking necessary measures to reduce domestic consumption.
Deputy Attorney General of Mexico Samuel Alba-Leyva
commented, "In Mexico, we don't understand why the
herbicides have raised such a commotion. The cultivation
and trafficking of marijuana are completely illegal
acts."1 0
Initial United States enthusiasm for the eradication
program also suffered from suspicions about the sincerity
of Mexican government officials. The attitude attributed
to the DEA agents in Mexico about Mexicans is that "they
are all corrupt and DEA agents must watch them,"11 became
pervasive in the late 1970's and may have been reinforced
by the Mexican government staff. Requests for more U.S.
aid in 1978 were based on the assessment that financial
9The Percy amendment is revised in discussions
concerning the 1986 Omnibus Drug Bill, see "Controversy
Over Omnibus Drug Legislation," Congressional Digest,
(November 1986), pp. 259-289.
10
"Mexico May Seek Aid To Replace Drug Crops,"
Albuquergue Journal, April 7, 1978, p. 1.
llu.s. Congress, Senate, "The Mexican Connection,"
p. 155.
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supplements for Mexican federal policies officers, provided
by the United States, prevented the spread of corruption.
Most recently, much has been made of Mexican
accountability to the United States in eradication
statistics. Operation Vanguard, a program by which United
States DEA agents fly with Mexican agents to verify
spraying operations, has become dysfunctional. In the
middle of 1989, the program fell into disarray for lack of
the proper equipment. DEA agents argued that verification
from fixed wing aircraft was time consuming and
inconclusive, and further stipulated that helicopters
originally promised for the operatives had not been
delivered.12 Lack of United States attention and financial
support has undermined a critical cooperative venture.
The breakdown of Mexican-United States cooperation can
be summarized by unfulfilled expectations. According to
William Walker, in Drua Control in the Americas:
Since the mid 1970s, authorities in Washington expected
consistently high performance by Mexico against illicit
drug traffic. Yet officials there, while often carrying
out uncompromising campaigns against opium and marijuana
growing, believed that Mexico's problems with drugs would
be far less serious if their counterparts north of the
border would take stronger actions to curb demand.13
12United States Congress, House of Representatives,
"Review of the 1989 International Drug Control Strategy,"
p. 59.
13Walker, Drua Control in the Americas, p. 214
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Eradication is not the panacea Mexico and United States
officials hoped it would be in the early 1970's. However,
eradication remains a major component of drug control
strategy. United States governmental enthusiasms for drug
control at the source has waxed and waned over the past
decades, and currently is being viewed as the crucial
component of drug control. Mexico has persistently
perceived eradication as a worthy enterprise, in part
because it fulfills other political and social functions
for the central government. Provided with the necessary
equipment and financial support, it is very likely that
Mexico would cooperate with the United States toward shared
objectives. Those objectives must encompass a realistic
perception of what eradication will contribute toward
overall supply reduction. Eradication and its source
control strategy complement, interdiction, provide two
crucial avenues wherein greater cooperation can lead to
progress toward coincident objectives.
B. INTERDICTION
Interdiction as a component of drug control strategy is
problematic for cooperative ventures in that it exacerbates
rather than ameliorates the issues of distinct national
sovereignty. Prejudicial appraisals of the intensity with
which Mexico prosecutes illicit drug traffickers,
sensitivity about the implied message of extradition and
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the perceived inconsistencies in each nation's drug
strategies tend to undermine the mutual trust required for
successful interdiction. Interdiction requires a unity of
purpose, an agreement on the nature of the problem and the
proper actions needed to arrest it.
Using the above stated parameters for successful
interdiction, it is easy to see why the United States and
Mexico have seldom worked effectively together in
interdicting illicit drugs. Mexico and the United States
have rarely shared similar views on the nature of the
threat, often resorting to blaming each other for either
"supplying" the problem or creating the problem with
"demand." However, as each nation has begun to view the
problem of drug trafficking as a national security threat,
a potentially useful convergence of perceptions may emerge.
A primary barrier to intensified cooperative
interdiction programs has been a lack of trust. United
States drug agents are suspicious, even of domestic
counterparts, and their distrust of corrupt Mexican
officials is apparent. Years of experience, coupled with
sincere Mexican efforts to reduce corruption by the Salinas
administration, provides for the possibility that
corruption and distrust can be averted, or at least,
circumvented.
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The DEA har been working with the Mexican Federal
Police since Operation Cooperation. Having dealt with
pervasive corruption among Mexican drug enforcement
officials for decades, DEA agents in country have developed
several mechanisms for circumventing corruption. One
measure is the creation of elite units, often funded by
United States aid.14 This effort has been debilitated by
intermittent attention from Congress in the issuance of
foreign aid. A second method of circumventing corruption,
the withholding of critical intelligence until the final
stage of an operation, has been successful in some
instances, but hinders cooperation.
The atmosphere of distrust is the most fervent obstacle
to cooperative interdiction. In particular, the murder of
DEA agent Enrique Camarena and th alleged torture of DEA
agent Victor Cortez, have soured the crucial bond between
the DEA and their Mexican counterparts. The DEA's
relentless pursuit of the Camarena affair has resulted in
threats by the Mexican government to sever all cooperative
agreements with the United States. While the DEA's
intentions are honorable, it is apparent that recent
14Ethan A. Nadelmann, "The DEA in Latin America:
Dealing with Institutionalized Corruption," Journal
Of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 29, no. 4,
(Winter 1987-1988), pp. 11-13.
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activities have been deplored even by the United States
Justice Department. Continued pursuit of Camarena
assailants jeopardizes the more critical issue of bilateral
ties, and the DEA must be more closely monitored.
It appears that the Camarena and Cortez affairs may be
receding, however, even as United States policy makers
continue to exacerbate the rift. The specific language of
the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act uses threatening language to
define terms for Mexican certification, making references
to diligence in pursuing drug traffickers, and mentions the
Enrique Camarena and Victor Cortez by name.15 The
magnification of this issue by the Congress, bolstered by a
recent television drama depicting the event, emphasized the
misplaced, albeit well-intentioned, focus of the United
States policy makers. The Camarena affair has produced
disdainful behavior on both sides of the border. Trust
must be restored. The federal government of the United
States should be taking measures to arrest the erosion of
trust, but to date has made little progress toward this
objective. Congress should begin with a reevaluation of
the goals of certification.
15Raphael Francis Perl, "The U.S. Congress,
International Drug Policy, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs,
vol. 30, no. 2 & 3, (Summer/Fall 1988), p. 36.
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The reconstruction of cooperative tendencies has
already begun at lower levels of international
organizatioxs. The Eighth International Drug Enforcement
Conference (IDEC) was held in Mexico City in April 1990.
IDEC is demonstrative of the most effective multilateral
efforts, successful because its narrow focus on narcotics
and law enforcement exploits common interests without the
encumbrance of linkage to other issues. Joint efforts
which stress law enforcement to law enforcement ties
between Mexico and the United States provide greater
opportunity for successful cooperation than large scale
interdiction schemes which tend to heighten nationalist
tensions.
Perhaps the most contentious interdiction issue is the
growing U.S. military presence in all facets of border
operations. From the U.S. perspective of the problem, the
military is seen as an organization with the equipment and
structure necessary to maximize and rationalize United
States interdiction efforts. Since the amendment of the
Posse Comitatus Act in 1981, the United States military has
been pressed into drug control operations by the United
States Congress eager to utilize idle resources. 16 The
16
"Controversy Over Omnibus Legislation," Qnaressional
Dgs, (November 1986), p. 266-272.
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expanded presence of United States military equipment and
manpower along the Southwest border, and at sea on the
Atlantic and Pacific Coast of Mexico, has the potential to
incur resentment of Mexicans fearful of United States
intervention. Haphazard schemes like calling for the
"Sealing of the Borders" in 45 days, proposed in May 1988,
and suggestions for shooting down suspected drug smuggling
aircraft, represent the most emotional and ill conceived
notions of a military role in the drug fight.17
Handled properly, the supplementation of undermanned
civilian law enforcement officials with military assets can
benefit interdiction on both sides of the border. The
critical element is the careful coordination of military
activities with Mexican government, and the skillful
fostering of a trusting bilateral relation through the
sharing of intelligence. Military aircraft, ships, radar,
aerostat balloons, and other electronic sensors have the
capability of providing a clearer picture of trafficking
patterns to United States and Mexican Officials. To the
extent United States military efforts enhance the
capability of the Mexican government to handle its own
domestic problems, the involvement serves cooperative ends.
17Ibid., p. 267.
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The availability of more information about drug
trafficking has the potential of creating divisiveness. In
the near term, Mexico is likely to be overwhelmed and ill
equipped to respond to the magnitude of the threat inside
its own borders. United States officials acknowledge that
successful interdiction throughout the Caribbean has forced
a significant increase of drug traffic through Mexico.18
Political and economic difficulties in Mexico will likely
constrain Mexican efforts to respond to this expansion in
traffic, fuelling United States frustrations about Mexican
efforts. As summarized by Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics Matters, Ann Wrobelski, economic
assistance is an imperative first step in future efforts.
I remain convinced that our enforcement efforts are
going to be at the margins in mine of these places
until we get at the economics.
The most insightful criticism of the use of the
military in interdiction is offered by Bruce Michael
Bagley. Indicting the so-called "realist paradigm" of
18Testimony of David Westrate, DEA administrator, in
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearing before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Task force on International
Narcotics Control, "Review of the 1989 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report," 101st Congress, 1st
session, March 14, 1989, (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1990), p. 124.
19From the U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,
"Review of the 1989 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, p. 142.
103
President Ronald Reagan's (1981-1989) drug control
strategy, which stipulated that hegemonic powers such as
the United States must assume responsibility for enforcing
international law and preserving order or risk anarchy,
2 0
Bagley asserts that the primary actors in international
drug trafficking "operate outside of, or in direct defiance
of national authorities."2 1 Using this criterion, the best
role for the military in interdiction is not in the
traditional application of force by one nation against the
other, but the employment of military assets to identify
and locate subnational actors working in defiance of
national authority. Applying this model, cooperation with
Mexican officials to assist in the reassertion of
governmental authority becomes the chief function of U.S.
policy. Bagley recommends the development of multilateral
approaches which replace unilateral pressure tactics, and
especially advocates the adoption of long term institution
building efforts to improve regulatory and enforcement
capabilities.2 2 Used properly, the military can function
as a pivotal actor in the endeavor.
20Bagley, "U.S. Foreign Policy And The War On Drugs:




Interdiction and eradication are complementary programs
which serve not only to limit the flow of illicit drugs to
consumers but also to reinforce governmental efforts to
restore the rule of law. Mexican programs can achieve both
political stability and drug control, provided that U.S.
government policy makers resist the temptation to act
unilaterally. Programs which enhance the image and
effectiveness of the Mexican government benefit mutual
goals, while the usurpation of Mexican sovereignty with
the supplanting of Mexican officers and agents by United
States forces contradicts that objective. Particularly
with respect to the support of Mexican legal institutions,
United States interdiction efforts must not assume the role
properly played by the Mexican government.
This view was expounded by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser in
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
when he stated
The United States should not try to fight its own battle
against drugs in the Mexican territory; the United States
must not attempt to supplant the job Mexico is doing by
imposing upon its neighbors its own inadequate
enforcement. Americans should trust in the determination
of the Mexicans and trust JD their ability to isolate and
eradicate the drug menace.'3
23U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Overview of United
States-Mexico Relations," 101st Congress, ist session, June




Extradition, seemingly a cornerstone of mutual trust,
has the potential of destroying the delicate fabric of
alliance in the battle against illegal drugs. United
States insistence on the extradition of drug traffickers
for more "judicious" punishment in the United States has
the concurrent ill effects of defaming the Mexican judicial
system, fueling critics of the Mexican government for
submitting paternalism, solidifying the resistance of
narco-terrorists and insurgents, and forcing the
politically unsavory option of further abandonment of the
Mexican constitution. Stipulation that Mexico agree to
extradition as a signal of cooperation for certification
purposes runs counter to long term drug control objectives.
There is little doubt that the issue which has
galvanized violent resistance to the government of Colombia
is extradition. Narco-terrorists threatened to destroy the
democratic government of Colombia solely on the issue of
extradition24 to the United States. The issue so polarized
the Colombian electorate that the 1990 elections became
practically a popular referendum on continued cooperation
with the United States on extradition. Similar
24Washington Post Weekly, May 7-13, 1990, p. 19.
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attitudes are beginning to emerge in Mexico, and have been
exacerbated by the recent "kidnapping" cf Dr. Humberto
Alvarez Machain.
In many ways the kidnapping of the Mexican doctor
alleged to have assisted in the torture of DEA agent
Enrique Camarena in 1985, is a microcosm of United States-
Mexican relations concerning drug control. It incited
Mexico's political sensitivity to incursions on its
sovereignty, demonstrated the DEA's distrust of the Mexican
legal system, and showed the failure of both governments to
effectively regulate their forces consistent with mutual
goals. Finally, the event revealed the volatility of
bilateral relations.
Dr. Alvarez was handed over to U.S. authorities in El
Paso, Texas on April 3, 1990, after having been forcibly
abducted by Mexican police in Guadalajara. The Mexicans
had supposedly been authorized a $50,000 reward by DEA
agents, a plan denied by the United States Attorney General
Dick Thornburgh.25 Mexican officials quickly voiced
protests over the event, with Mexican Attorney General
Enrique Alvarez del Castillo warning that joint anti-drug
efforts were "at risk,"26 and President Salinas stating
25New York Times, May 27, 1990, p. Al.
26New York Times, April 20, 1990, p. Al.
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that a good relationship with the United States was
possible only if Washington respected Mexico's sovereignty
and rights.27
The extent of the damage to joint drug efforts is
difficult to overestimate. Response by critics, and even
supporters of cooperative activities, to the Dr. Alvarez
affair, was rapid and devastating. A Mexico news magazine,
Proceso, published a list of 49 DEA agents operating in
Mexico within weeks of the incident.28 On May 25, 1990,
Mexico retaliated by demanding the eradication of United
States DEA agent Hector Berrellez for involvement in the
kidnapping, in a destructive spirit of quid pro quo.29 The
renegade activities of DEA agents jeopardized a sensitive
mutual legal assistance treaty in negotiations for two
years, and precipitated the issuance of new rules for DEA
agents in Mexico by the Mexican Foreign Relations
Secretariat.3 0
27New York Times, May 27, 1990, p. A4.
2 8New York Times, April 24, 1990, p. A7.
2 9
"Arrest, Extradition Requested," FBIS-Latin American
Re~ort, May 30, 1990, p. 87.
3 0
"New Rules on DEA Presence," FBIS-Latin American
Report, June 20, 1990, p. 14.
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Mexico has begun renewed efforts to dislodge corrupt
officials from positions of political authority, and has
begun to fulfill United States expectations with the arrest
of drug kingpin Felix Gallardo and Caro Quintero.31
However, while United States enforcement officials are
encouraged by the response of the Mexican government in
many areas, extradition remains a point of friction.
President Bush, sensitive to the political climate in
Mexico, surreptitiously ignored compliance with
certification legislation by omitting any reference to
extradition in reporting Mexican cooperation in both 198
and 1989.32 Prospects for future cooperation depend on the
cessation of ill-advised demands that Mexico respond to
calls for extradition by the United States. Emphasizing
extradition as a central measure of cooperation, without
regard to the potentially destabilizing effects, is a
dangerous measure and is a major weakness of Congressional
certification.
D. INTELLIGENCE
The sharing of critical information is one of the best
means of cementing an alliance. With a keen awareness of
31U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, "Review of
the 1989 International Narcotics Strategy Report," p. 182.
3 2Ibid., p. 184.
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the dangers of compromising vital intelligence sources by
disclosing data to corrupt officials, the United States
should seek ways to support Mexican drug control activities
by focusing their efforts with intelligence. Controversial
as this measure may be, especially among DEA agents in
Mexico, it is a necessary step in furthering cooperation.
Intelligence gathering and dissemination has been a
major weakness of United States strategy, and the National
Drug Control Strateav calls attention to this deficiency.
The creation of the National Drug Intelligence Center
(NDIC) is in part a recognition that the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC) is ill equipped to coordinate
and distribute intelligence data to the necessary agencies.
NDIC, combined with Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FINCEN) has the capability of compiling the integrated
picture of drug trafficking needed to pursue conspiracy
cases.33 However, the dissemination of this vital
intelligence is still mired in complex bilateral agendas
through oversight by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
While it may appear advisable that the CIA manage
disclosures of foreign intelligence for use by law
enforcement, there are allegations that the CIA has in the
33The White House, National Drua Control Stratev,
p. 59-60.
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past maintained a shocking conflict of interest. In a
Washington Post article in July 1990, it was alleged that
the CIA may have sheltered drug traffickers from
prosecution to protect its sources.34 Among the alleged to
have received protection from the CIA is a major
trafficker, Felix Gallardo. Such internal inconsistencies
in United States intelligence are also detrimental to
Mexican drug control efforts.
A rationalization of United States intelligence
gathering and suitable procedures for disclosure can
provide essential information for Mexican officials in
their pursuit of drug traffickers. In the near term,
electronic sensor data and radar tracking data transferred
to Mexican officials can be used as a measure of how well
intelligence is being utilized by Mexico.
E. DILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
The many economic, political and social issues which
call attention to the interdependence of Mexico and the
United States are so diverse as to defy effective
governmental control. Bruce Michael Bagley correctly
assesses that subnational actors tend to dominate United
States-Mexico interrelations. However, since illicit drug
control is an issue of national security interest to both
34Washin=ton Post Weekly, July 23-29, 1990, p. 31.
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nations, agreement of the magnitude of the problem ought to
foster greater bilateral cooperation. Most certainly the
governments of both nations have the power to set national
priorities, yet there is little evidence that the national
security issue of drug control has been given proper
priority in the agenda of bilateral issues.
In 1986 Mexican Attorney General Garcia Ramirez adeptly
expressed this sentiment
I believe that rather than something that divides us,
this struggle should bring us together. Unlike other
issues in our bilateral relations, in which opinions
are expressed freely, autonomously and rationally, in
the campaign against drugs, there shouldn't be, there
can not be difference of opinion.3
The problem with the forums designed for the resolution
of bilateral problems is that they are plagued by
traditional power politics. Politicians from both nations
use the Interparliamentary meeting between the Mexican and
U.S. legislatures to posture rather than negotiate. Mexico
has come to see this particular forum as a mechanism for
U.S. coercion. Critics of the Interparliamentary meeting
argue that "the United States government never respects
agreements made by its legislators in these meetings and
keeps pressuring Mexico to do so."36
35"Fighting Drug Traffic," Voices of Mexico,
(September-November 1986), p. 57.
36FBIS-Latin American Report, May 16, 1985, p. M3.
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Despite the fear of domination and coercion expressed
by the Mexicans, Mexico has entered into more than 46
bilateral agreements on drug control with the United States
since 1973. 37 The number of bilateral accords seems to
have negligible effect on improving cooperative drug
enforcement. The problem may not be with Mexico's
willingness to enter into bilateral agreements, but with
the objectives U.S. policy makers hope to achieve with such
agreements. Formal bilateral agreements of the future
should look to strengthen drug control efforts on both
sides of the border, not just the Mexican side.
P. UFLTILATURAL Z7FORTS
Multilateral accords offer a method of creating an
international consensus that supports greater bilateral
ties. The tremendous concentration of drug activities on
the Southwest border demands that imposition of measures
and levels of cooperation probably too extreme for
international agreement. The United Nations sponsored
Vienna Convention on Narcotics Control ratified by Mexico
in 1989 and the United States in 1990 provides a firm
foundation for broadening bilateral cooperation.
37Samuel I. del Villar, "The Illicit United States-
Mexico Drug Market: Failure of Policy and an Alternative,"
in Roett, ed., MeXico and the United States: Manaaing the
RelationghJn, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1988), p. 191.
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The primary benefit derived from multilateral
agreements is that they free the Mexican government from
the stigma of U.S. paternalism. At the Vienna conference,
Mexico was able to disclose plans for a new anti-drug
effort that involved greater bilateral cooperation,
confident that since the plan was announced as part of an
international accord it would be immune to political attack
at home.38
Multilateral solutions can not fully address the
complex relationship that effective drug control on the
Southwest border requires. However, multilateral
agreements are useful for creating a foundation for
agreement on contentious bilateral issues. Finally,
multilateral agreements offer the Mexican government refuge
from domestic criticism concerning the expansion of ties
with the United States on drug control policy.
G. ABBRBING THE FUTURE OF COOPERATIVE DRUG POLICY
Cooperative initiatives in drug control policy to date
have been largely the product of U.S. coercion and Mexican
concession. Friction has arisen when Mexican efforts have
failed to meet expectations, and the United States has felt
compelled to act unilaterally. Cooperation has also been
38
"Government To Announce New Anti-Drug Plan,"
FBIS-Latin American Report, September 13, 1989, p. 6.
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plagued by inconsistency in setting policy priorities, and
iT ttention to Mexico's constraints, on the part of U.S.
policy makers. U.S. policy often has reflected a lack of
patience and an insensitivity to Mexico's turbulent
political environment. It is the function of the United
States government to correct these shortcomings and develop
a cooperative frame of mind among its agencies.
U.S. aims can be better served by offering assistance
and incentives for cooperation. Mexico is already
dedicated to fighting drug trafficking for its own
survival, so exhorting Mexico to do better with punitive
measures seems futile and perhaps counterproductive. U.S.
policy should explore methods of cooperation that permit
the greater and more efficient use of Mexican resources for
fighting drugs. Certification by Congress and kidnappings
by the DEA serve neither of these goals.
Cooperation in the future must assist Mexico in the
mobilization of its own assets for drug control, and must
not seek to supplant Mexican efforts with U.S.
intervention. In the long term the U.S. will derive little
benefit from policies which undercut Mexican sovereignty.
The true objective of cooperative policy should be to
strengthen Mexico's ability to act effectively as a
partner.
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V. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION AND
CONCLUSION
United States drug control policy requires the
assistance of the Mexican government to achieve the
magnitude of supply reduction needed for success. The
political and economic costs of unilateral interdiction
along the Southwest border are so high that such a policy
must be discounted. Interdictions is only a partial
objective in the battle against illicit drugs.
The goal of United States policy with regard to drug
control on the Southwest border should be the attainment of
sustainable cooperation for the greatest impact on drug
flows. Achieving this goal requires the abandonment of
unilateral policies for programs that assist and strengthen
the Mexican government's ability to fight drug production
and trafficking. Incentives, not coercive measures, offer
the strongest possibility of lasting cooperation.
Based on an assessment of the constraints on
cooperative initiatives and an analysis of historical
efforts at cooperation on drug control, the following
policies for bilateral efforts are proposed. The proposals
reflect agreement with two policy options expounded by
116
Bruce Michael Bagley.1 Given that intervention in Mexico
and the legalization of drugs are unsuitable alternatives
for United States policy, financing the mobilization of
Mexico's drug fighting capabilities and providing economic
alternatives to the drug trade are recommended. To these
goals must be added measures which enhance the legitimacy
and control of the Mexican government. United States
policy is dependent on the success of Mexican efforts for
the success of its own fight against drugs.
A. PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION
For bilateral cooperation to be effective, the U.S.
government must establish priorities that direct the
actions of federal, state and local agencies toward that
end. Because there is such a multitude of linkages between
drug control policy and other bilateral issues, the
hierarchy of goals must be definitive enough to prevent
bureaucratic interests from eclipsing national interests.
The following proposals are recommended to create the
greatest possible cooperative framework, taking into
account constraints in both countries. Where limitations
on implementation of a policy exist, they are addressed.
1Bagley, "The New Hundred Years War?: U.S. National
Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America," in Donald
Mabry, ed., The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S.
National Security, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1990), p. 52-53.
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1. Resist Intervention
The domestic political volatility of Mexico makes
the introduction of more United States personnel in that
country counterproductive. The Salinas government is
already under fire from political opposition on the Left
for its limited cooperation with the United States. An
increased United States presence in Mexico would serve only
to undermine the legitimacy of the Mexican government and
catalyze the opposition.
Extradition is a form of United States intervention
that also must be abandoned. The short term gain from
incarcerating a drug criminal in the United States is not a
comparable trade-off for the damage done to Mexican legal
institutions. A patient, cooperative effort to work with
and strengthen Mexican legal institutions has significant
benefits for both countries. If United States actions
mitigate the rule of law in Mexico, the Mexican government
will suffer a further erosion of popular support.
Bilateral and multilateral agreements should be employed to
achieve a consensus on what constitutes just punishment for
drug offenses.
2. Provide Zoonomic Assistance
Debt relief, a free trade agreement, and
alternative crop programs for drug cultivating regions are
three mechanisms by which the United States can
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simultaneously improve the stability of the Mexican
government and enhance Mexico's ability to fight illegal
drugs. Any program which contributes to the PRI's
objective of increasing the pace of economic development
strengthens the government and allows for more resources to
be devoted to the battle against illegal drug production
and trafficking. Economic assistance offers a means of
providing indirect support for United States eradication
and interdiction goals in Mexico.
Currently, budget limitations severely restrict
levels of foreign aid. However, a reshuffling of U.S. aid
priorities, particularly in Central America, can produce
the kind of funding necessary to begin an alternative crop
program. A free trade agreement is another form of
economic assistance, one that gives the Mexican government
the impetus to cooperate more extensively with the United
States. Finally, compared to the funds now being spent for
drug control, an inexpensive mixture of aid and economic
incentives may be more fiscally feasible.
3. Utilize The Justice Department As Lead Agency
The complexity of interdependence issues in the
United States-Mexican relationship makes drug control an
unbearable burden for the State Department. Moreover,
State Department involvement in supervising drug control
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operations represents a conflict of interests. The State
Department should be tasked with ways of assisting Mexican
drug efforts, not verification of them.
The Justice Department has practically supplanted
the State Department in coordinating bilateral drug
efforts, and United States policy should reflect this.
Under the strict control of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy the Justice Department, specifically the
Attorney General and the director of the DEA, should
spearhead efforts to coordinate United States cooperation
on drug enforcement with Mexico. A bilateral law
enforcement framework is much less vulnerable to influence
by other bilateral issues of contention than a program let
by the highly visible State Department.
In the wake of the kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez, it is
apparent that the DEA does not yet have all the diplomatic
skills needed for successful cooperation. However, the
restrictions on DEA activities in Mexico imposed by the
U.S. and Mexican governments in the aftermath of that
incident should create the necessary guidelines to regulate
DEA behavior consistent with bilateral goals.
4. impose Strict Guidelines For Operations In Mexico
The Office of National Drug Control Policy and the
heads of agencies should make clear the priority of United
States interests with regard to Mexico. The continued
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pursuit of revenge in the Camarena affair or talk of a
hemispheric drug raid are clearly inconsistent with drug
policy, and often national goals. The United States policy
makers must be on guard against militaristic, unilateral
approaches claiming short term solutions.
In the same way, governmental guidelines should be
broad enough to allow for lucrative innovations. United
States policy makers should not try to micro-manage
bilateral cooperative efforts, as setting specific criteria
in certification clearly does.
S. Forge Consensus Multilaterally, Not Bilaterally
To shape United States-Mexican agreements, the
United States should pursue multilateral approaches. The
debate over policy in the existing bilateral forums creates
the impression of United States intransigence and coercion.
Additionally, cooperative agreements framed in bilateral
negotiations make the Mexican government vulnerable to
political attacks for surrendering perceived interests.
Any further concessions made by Mexico hurt government
prestige. Similarly, Congressional attacks on Mexican drug
fighting behavior should be concealed in standards applied
to all drug production and trafficking states. The United
Nations' convention on Illegal Narcotics Control provides a
firm foundation for bilateral efforts.
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6. Share Intelligence
United States efforts should seek discrete ways to
maximize the efficiency of Mexican drug control operations.
This is best established by intelligence sharing.
Intelligence can focus the activities of Mexico's drug
enforcement agencies without significantly raising the cost
of operations. The transfer or leasing of transportation
and surveillance equipment also supports Mexican drug
efforts without an increase in United States presence.
United States allegations of corruption in Mexico
must not threaten U.S. cooperation with Mexico. The United
States can assist President Salinas' campaign against
corruption by sharing relevant information. Complaints
about the inefficiency of Mexican drug control forces must
be addressed by providing the technical intelligence to
improve their performance. Mexico must be considered a
valuable ally that can not fail. Intelligence support
should reflect this valued perception.
Resistance to sharing intelligence with Mexican
officials is to be expected form U.S. intelligence
agencies. To foster a more trusting relationship, U.S.
agencies can first grant their Mexican counterparts access
to data from electronic sensors and other non-vulnerable
sources. If corruption remains so pervasive that this
information is compromised, then this policy can be
abandoned with no lasting damage to more sensitive sources.
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7. Develop Xntermilitary Ties
The great imbalance in the size of forces makes
military cooperation a daunting proposal for Mexico.
Small, symbolic joint operations in drug control will
facilitate the sharing of professional experience and
solidify the cooperation framework. To date there have
been no noteworthy military exchanges. This reflects
Mexican reluctance.
To overcome Mexican unwillingness to join
binational military ventures, U.S. proposals for joint
operations should stress mutual rewards from such endeavors
and grant the Mexican military greater influence in the
structure and planning of exercises. U.S. military
equipment and Mexican military experience in drug control
operations is a valuable combination for developing new
counternarcotics tactics.
S. Improve Coordination of U.B. Efforts
Finally, cooperative efforts need to be enhanced by
a greater coordination and efficiency in U.S. interdiction
efforts. Until the United States addresses problems with
its own drug control policy, it can not hope to
successfully direct the efforts of others. Sealing the
border and launching a hemispheric drug raid are proposals
by a government frustrated with the inefficiency
interdiction policies. The National Drua Control Strategy
goes a long way towards achieving this end. Continued
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adherence to a unified national strategy will demonstrate
the perseverance that U.S. allies, including Mexico, say is
lacking. A better United States effort also relieves the
stress in Mexico that arises from the perception that
Mexicans are being forced to suffer while the United States
does nothing about consumer demand.
B. CONCLUSION
The bureaucratic battles to develop a coherent and
effective drug control policy are not yet over.
Significant progress has been made, however, by recognizing
that the United States can not solve its problem
unilaterally and by acknowledging that successful policy
must address both the supply of, and demand for illicit
drugs. These two important interim conclusions underscore
the critical importance of Mexico as a partner in effective
drug control policy.
An understanding of the constraints on bilateral
cooperation in both Mexico and the United States is
essential for the development of future policy. By
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